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Abstract:
This masters thesis assesses the impact of a emissions trading on short-term carbon
abatement and investment decisions in the power sector.
Environmental benefits from carbon abatement due to emissions trading are quantified
using top-down trend analysis and a bottom-up power sector model "E-simulate" to define
upper and lower boundaries on carbon abatement in Germany in the first phase of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme (2005-2007).
The long-term economic and investment implications of emissions trading form the
centerpiece of the thesis. A sample coal and gas investment project is modeled using
discounted cash flows and analyzed using probabilistic Monte Carlo methods. The model
results help explain the empirical evidence of an increase in coal investments in Germany
against a preference for gas in the wider European market. The model is used to separately
discuss both the price and allocation effects of emissions trading on investment decisions in
the power sector. The modeling provides evidence of the dominance of fuel prices on the
long-term investment decision and highlights under which carbon and fuel price scenarios
the current preference for coal over gas investments could be reversed. Model results show
a good match when compared to power spreads which are created using empirical data.
Furthermore, related policy domains such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and Renewable energy policy are assessed and sector-wide carbon abatement estimates are
reconciled between fuel switching and emissions displacement from renewables.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In the spring of 2009, the world finds itself in several states of distress with a highly
uncertain outlook on the future. In the US, the Obama Administration has made climate
change one of the key policy priorities; yet the outlook on carbon markets and even the
regulatory authority between EPA and Congress remains unclear. The EU with a
significant carbon market is firmly committed to post-2012 carbon markets regardless of
whether or not an international consensus is reached. This continuing regulatory
uncertainty for the power sector comes at a time in which the world finds itself in the
midst of the largest recession since the Great Depression; the global financial crisis has
all but closed the credit markets, freezing large debt-financed infrastructure investments.
In the US and Europe, gigantic government subsidy programs promise rapid aid for
"shovel-ready" projects, with the very first grants, loan subsidies and tax incentives being
rolled out while government agencies are sill increasing staff levels and write grant
proposals.
At the same time, governments and utilities must look beyond the near-term demand
contraction and plan the investments required to support the long-term energy demand
growth. This also includes making significant investments in more flexible power grids
and providing incentives for the development of a lower carbon intensive power sector.
Yet, while environmental economics could suggest that carbon regulation would end the
use of coal, exactly this fuel is chosen for large parts of the future grid mix. This thesis
will analyze the carbon price effects on long-term investments in the power sector. The
analysis will distinguish between price effects and allocation effects using various
quantitative methods to analyze empirical and market data from the European Union's
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS).
1.2. Background on Emissions Markets
The fundamental justification for emissions trading markets results from the desire of
regulators to price environmental externalities. Emissions trading caps the total carbon
output, thus providing certainty over output; trading between participants is allowed so
that largest amount of abatement can occur at the lowest marginal cost. Although Europe
has taken the lead on carbon markets, first environmental markets were envisioned in the
United States in the 1970s but only implemented at full-scale in the early 1990s. The
economist Pigou (1932) first suggested internalizing environmental costs through a tax;
then Ronald Coase (1960) challenged the polluter pays principle and proved efficient
outcomes could be achieved independently of initial allocation. Dales (1968) continued
with this notion and strengthened the concept of transferable property rights for public
goods, which was contrary to command and control regulations of the time. The US
Clean Air Act first allowed companies to offset higher emissions through emission
reduction credits, reducing implementation by up to 90%, compared to traditional
command and control regulation, and providing an economic incentive to invest in
technologies of lower carbon intensity (Tietenberg 1985). Following the success of this
environmental market mechanism, it was continually applied in the US for a reduction in
lead gasoline in the 1980s, as well as the sulphur dioxide emissions in coal power that
formed part of the 1990 Clean Air Act (Ellerman 2003).
On an international level, emissions trading was implemented in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
which is now regarded as a central pillar of global climate policy. Since its ratification in
2005, it has served as the central international climate change regulatory framework and
as the basis for the global carbon market. It sets legally binding targets for the reduction
by 2012 of the six main greenhouse gases (GHGs) below 1990 levels on all Annex 1
countries which have ratified the treaty. Developing countries have no binding carbon
emission reduction targets, but play a central role in the Kyoto Protocol.
Under the Treaty, three 'flexible mechanisms' were established which aim at helping
achieve the emission reduction targets at least cost:
* Joint Implementation (JI): Investment among Annex 1 countries to
generate Emission Reduction Units (ERUs);
* Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): Investment in an emission
reduction project in a non-Annex 1 country to generate Certified Emission
Reductions (CERs), which can be sold globally.
* Emissions Trading: An Annex 1 country can sell its emission rights
granted under the Treaty - Assigned Amount Units (AAUs) to another Annex 1
country.
Emissions reductions can be achieved within industrialized countries or be bought from
carbon emissions offsetting projects in the developing world, which contributes to the
reduction of carbon dioxide globally. The third flexible mechanism, emissions trading,
served as the inspiration for the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) which
has been implemented into EU law through the Emissions Trading Directive (European
Commission 2003). The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation will
be briefly discussed in Chapter 8, as these credits serve as an alternative to domestic
abatement that will be described in Chapter 2.
Recently, several other compliance and voluntary carbon markets have been developed,
such as the Chicago Climate Exchange or the Australian scheme in New South Wales.
The total global carbon market in 2008 recorded revenues of over 125 billion dollars, the
exact split between markets will be published by the World Bank in May 2009 in their
annual publication "States and Trends of the Carbon Market". The table below depicts
the historic development of the market, showing the rapid growth both in value and total
transaction volumes.
Table 1.1: Global carbon markets volume and value
Source: Kapoor, Ambrosi (2008) and Point Carbon (2008)
1.3. The EU-ETS and the Power Sector
The EU ETS (European Trading Scheme), launched on January 1, 2005, is the key
element of EU climate policy to comply with its Kyoto commitments. The EU ETS is
currently the largest carbon market and has materially impacted the economic operations
and investment decision-making process in the power sector, which is the largest single
polluting sector. The research for this thesis is motivated by the large policy interest in
this area and is enabled by the recent data availability and good reporting from the
relatively liquid allowance markets. The cap and trade scheme covers about 11.500
energy intensive installations which account for around 44.7 percent of total emissions
from the 27 states (2.2 billion tonnes). Emission 'allowances' are given to each operator,
who is obliged to keep their emissions below the level permitted or they will have to buy
allowances from other operators. Currently in its Phase II (2008-2012), the EU ETS
establishes an annual cap at 5.8 percent below the 2005 verified emissions and a non-
compliance penalty of €100 (up from E40). At the same time, it is maintaining the
obligation to cover any shortfall in the period, the introduction of aviation (from 2012
onwards), and the possibility of banking (keeping credits for use in future years).
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Figure 1.1 Phase I allocation by sector and country
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The power generation assets form part of the "combustion" installations which form the
largest single sector in the EU-ETS. The chart above shows the Phase I allocations by
installation and country, specifying whether the installation was over-allocated (long
position above the origin) or under-allocated (short position below the origin). The data
shows the large discrepancies in countries' overall positions, with the United Kingdom
(GB), Spain (ES) and Italy (IT) being the economies with allocations over 250 million
tons to have net short positions. The initial allocation shown for Germany was later
reduced using the so-called ex-post adjustment mechanism, making Germany a net-
importer of emissions credits.!
Emissions and Power generation in Germany
The unification of East and West Germany in 1990 started a process of industrial
reorganization and consolidation of the former East Germany, which had a marked effect
1 The European Commission contested the ex-post adjustment, yet Germany prevailed in the European
Court of Justice (Weishaar, 2008).
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Figure 1.2: Macro-economic indicators, power prices and emissions since 1990
Source: German government, CRF reports
The chart shows that immediately following the reunification, in the years 1990-1996,
German economy-wide CO2 emissions were reduced by 10%. This coincided with a
comparable reduction in industrial activity as measured by the gross value added (GVA)
of the industry component of the national income statistics. 1996 marks a turning point:
From then on, industrial activity rose more or less steadily, as did power production and
GVA for the economy as a whole. Notably however, primary energy consumption
remained flat, before a significant reduction in 2007, and economy-wide CO 2 emissions
continued to decline. A particularly remarkable feature of the post-1996 period is the
recovery of industrial activity, especially in the three years that marked the trial period.
From 1996 through 2004, there was an annual increase of 2.1% of constant dollar GVA
in the industrial sector excluding construction and power, rising to 4.4% growth between
2004 and 2007. The carbon emissions that were associated with this increase were by and
large included in the EU ETS, although the sub-sectors accounting for the extra growth,
like machine tools, electronics and optics, are not especially carbon intensive.
These trends are also reflected in the German power sector. In particular, fossil
generation, which had fallen by 6% between 1990 and 1999, has since then risen by 12%
in 2007, about half of which was lignite and the other half natural gas. In part, this trend
reflects the fact that electricity use is increasing apace with GDP, but it also reflects the
decline in nuclear generation. As shown in Figure 3, the level of generation from
combined nuclear and fossil generation has increased only very slightly since 1999
(+2.2%). The contemporaneous increase in demand of almost 14% has been met almost
entirely by renewable energy, an effect that will be further explored in Chapter 6 of the
thesis. The increased fossil generation has made up for the 17% reduction in nuclear
generation, which is presumably a reflection of the German government decision in 2000
to phase out nuclear power.
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Figure 1.3: German power generation by fuel type
Source: German government, CRF reports
1.4. Approach and Methods of Analysis
Fundamentally, this thesis aims to explore the effects that carbon emissions trading and
the presence of a carbon price have on long-term investment behavior in the power
sector. Germany is chosen as a specific case study of analysis, given that it is the largest
European economy, and has a diversified fleet of power generation technologies, and is
the largest participant in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS). In order to
accurately model the long-term effect of a carbon price on the power sector, the short-
term environmental and fuel switching effects need to be understood. This is done using
the bottom-up power model called "E-simulate", a cost-minimization model that
simulates European electricity generation dispatch on an hourly basis over an annual
cycle at the power plant level. This model is explained more fully in in Delarue,
Ellerman, and D'haeseleer (2008). The entire system is organized as a set of
interconnected 'zones', each of which corresponds to a specific country or group of
countries, of which Germany is one. The demand for electricity is specified by zone for
each hour of the year, and the model solves for the least cost dispatch of generation to
meet electricity demand in all zones, given daily fuel prices. E-simulate operates as a
linked hourly stacking model in which the dispatch of available generation is determined
by power plant characteristics and fuel prices. This bottom-up method is combined with a
top-down analysis, based on carbon emissions intensities, to estimate lower and upper
boundaries for carbon emissions abatement. Furthermore, the model is used for assessing
the capacity factor of all generation assets of the same technology and fuel type as well as
the marginal fuel at every hour of the year. It is an indirect method of calculating the
capacity factor of the system and it is a key input to assess the profitability of power
investments. The marginal fuel analysis adjusts for the ramp times of the different
generation technologies, as defined in the technical specifications of each power
generation technology.
The main economic analysis regarding the long-term investment behavior in the power
sector relies on several modeling methodologies that are combined to provide a better
insight into the profitability of a marginal coal and gas investment. The model is based on
a discounted cash flow model that calculates the annual cash in- and outflows from the
operation of a power plant, under the technical assumptions which are taken from the
previously mentioned, bottom-up "E-simulate" model. Rather than relying on a static
analysis of several price scenarios, as is often done in the literature, the model uses
probabilistic methods to provide a more dynamic insight into the power sector. The
principal inputs into the model, gas prices, coal prices, and carbon prices, are entered as
distributions which are fitted to the empirical data set. This way, the model is used to
calculate returns on investment, both as a net present value calculation as well as an
internal rate of return calculation to determine the more profitable investment. In addition
to several model outcomes, standard sensitivity analysis is applied to all the key technical
and financial inputs to quantify the impact that a change in these factors would have on
the final outcomes.
Finally, the results from these model simulations are compared to empirical data of power
sector spreads that are reported on power exchanges, or by financial data providers, such
as Bloomberg or Reuters. Power spreads compare the power price to the input prices
required to generate power and make several simplifying assumptions as to the technical
details of power generation. These spreads are calculated for the earnings a utility makes
for generating power one MWh from coal (called dark spread), as well as the earnings
from generating one MWh using gas (called spark spread). These power market spreads
can then be reduced by the carbon price given the carbon intensity of the fuel (then called
"clean" dark or spark spreads). These spreads provide a daily quantification of the
earnings a utility can make; subtracting the spark from the dark spread provides an
insight as to whether it is more profitable to generate power from gas or from coal.
Assuming that a marginal power investment is only dispatched when it is profitable to do
so, these spreads implicitly express capacity factors and can thus be compared to the
capacity factors that the bottom-up model calculates.
1.5. Thesis Structure
The thesis provides quantitative modeling approaches to estimate both the environmental
and the economic consequences that emissions trading has on the power sector.
Chapter 2 explores these environmental effects of carbon trading by quantifying the
options for carbon emissions abatement. Short-term fuel switching in the power sector is
analyzed by using several top-down and bottom-up modeling techniques.
Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the empirical evidence of changing investment
behavior in the EU-ETS before and during the first phase from 2005-2008. Furthermore,
this chapter provides a literature review of the methods used to model long-term
investment decision uncertainty.
Chapter 4 describes the power plant investment model that is the centerpiece of analysis
of this thesis. The uncertainties of the input parameters, the distribution fitting process
and the sampling using Monte Carlo methods are described in detail.
Chapter 5 discusses the price effects of emissions trading. Empirical data is used to
calculate clean dark and spark spreads and these outcomes are compared with the results
generated by the power sector models.
Chapter 6 quantifies the allocation effects that emissions trading has on the profitability
of investments and technology choice. The chapter discusses the allocation mechanisms
of grandfathering, benchmarking, and auctioning in more detail. It also comprises the
effects that policy changes regarding new entrant and closure rules have had on the
economics of power generation.
Chapter 7 discusses the broader implications of carbon trading by looking at the related
policy fields of the Clean Development Mechanism and renewable energy policy. The
results show a good fit between top-down estimates of the entire power industry
including renewables and the sum of the two bottom-up estimates for carbon abatement
in the power sector from fuel switching and carbon abatement from renewables.
The final chapter draws conclusions on the overall environmental and economic
implications of this work and suggests areas for future research.
2. Measuring Short-term Abatement and Implications for
Long-term Investment Decisions
While the main aim of the thesis is to explore the investment implications of a carbon
price on the power sector, the long-term effects are an aggregation of short-term
economic signals that induce fuel switching as a consequence of the carbon price. Hence
understanding the fundamental mechanism of fuel switching is crucial for the analysis
presented in chapters four and onwards. The bottom-up model presented in this chapter
will be applied on the one hand to inform the assumptions for the capacity factor made in
the investment model, and, on the other, to have the opportunity of cross-checking the
model results with empirical data presented in later chapters.
2.1 Introducing methodology of measuring emissions intensities
More specifically, the reduction in CO 2 emissions is a consequence of switching from
coal to the relatively less CO2 intensive gas. Since reductions can be estimated only by
comparison of actual emissions with what emissions would have been absent the EU ETS
and the CO 2 price associated with it, analysts are forced to estimate this unobserved
counterfactual. In this chapter, two different methods of quantifying the carbon emissions
abatement are presented. Firstly, a top-down trend analysis, as used by Ellerman and
Buchner (2008), is applied to the EU as a whole; secondly, a bottom-up approach is
applied, according to Delarue et al. (2008), who already focused on the power sector
using the simulation model applied to the EU as a whole.
The top-down approach is based on trends in economic activity, emissions, and emission
intensities that require an analysis of these trends prior to the start of the EU ETS on
January 1, 2005. Essentially, this approach assumes a continuation of these trends in the
absence of a carbon price. Particular attention is given to the trends in emissions intensity
for various indicators of economic activity. The economic activity and emissions can be
observed ex post, but a counterfactual needs to be constructed by extrapolating business
as usual carbon intensities from 2000-2004 and combining these intensities with the
observed levels of economic activity from 2005 onwards. The difference between that
level of emissions and what is observed with the carbon price constitutes the top-down
estimate of abatement. Implicitly, this approach assumes that the surrounding factors
would have stayed the same; and this is rarely the case. Accordingly, any complete
analysis requires consideration of other factors affecting emissions that have changed
from the pre-policy period. Examples are fuel prices and renewable energy policy, which
will be addressed in Chapter 7. As will be explained, at least some of the abatement that
can be inferred by this top-down approach cannot be attributed to the carbon price.
Hence, this estimate forms an upper limit on abatement.
For a lower limit estimate, the methodology only focuses on the power sector, which
constitutes 61% of the C0 2 emissions within the sectors included in the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme in Germany. It is widely acknowledged (and implicit in the windfall
profits critique) that power companies priced the value of CO2 into their bids for
supplying electricity to the grid. The additional carbon cost in the electricity supply bids
would change the dispatch of power plants depending on their type and the availability of
lower emitting (generally natural gas fired) plants to substitute for higher emitting
(generally coal) plants at various times throughout the year. The availability of lower
emitting generation for such fuel switching depended heavily on fuel prices and the load
at particular hours. To make this estimate, the model simulates the operation of the
German power sector as part of the European grid and resolves supply on an hour-by-
hour and plant-by-plant basis. The actual demand and fuel prices, both of which are
assumed to be independent of the carbon price, were included, too. The difference
between simulations with and without the actual C0 2 price provides a bottom-up estimate
of abatement in the German power sector. Since it is likely that other sectors reduced
emissions to some extent in response to the CO 2 price, this estimate must be considered a
lower bound. Also, the simulation model would not capture other effects of the carbon
price, such as lower demand for electricity or improved efficiencies in power plants in
response to the higher fuel/carbon price.
2.2 Top-down Estimate of Abatement
Top-down estimates of abatement, such as those first essayed for the EU ETS by
Ellerman and Buchner (2007), rely upon aggregate data and comparison of trends before
and after some policy measure is implemented. Typically, the analyst is looking for some
break in the trend that could indicate that the policy had an effect. As an ex post exercise,
the analyst also has the advantage of knowing the evolution of other factors that would
cause emissions to be higher or lower, independently of the policy measure, or in this
case, the price of CO2 as expressed in European Union allowances (EUAs). Obviously,
much depends on the choice of trend. The evolution of emission levels is not necessarily
helpful, since it can be influenced by these other factors. Attributing the emission
reduction to the policy measure would not be warranted, or at the least it would constitute
an overstatement of the measure's effect. An important assumption in evaluating the
effect of some policy measure is that the pre-policy trend in CO2 intensity, and
specifically of CO 2 emissions associated with various indicators of economic activity,
would have continued without the policy measure. Intensity is not fixed; it will vary from
year to year as a result of fluctuations in weather, energy prices, and the composition of
economic activity. Nevertheless, the extrapolated values can be seen as an expectation
that can be adjusted to the extent these other factors and their effect on intensity are
known. The effect of the policy - in terms of carbon abatement - is measured by
difference from what is observed and the counterfactual projection of the pre-policy trend
into the policy period. Thus, counterfactual emissions would be the projected pre-policy
intensity trend times the observed ex post indicator of economic activity. Figure 2.1
provides the basic elements of such an analysis of the effect of the EU ETS on
Germany's CO2 emissions.
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Figure 2.1: Emissions and Economic Activity Growth Rates
Source: German Government, DEHSt
The pairs of columns provide the annual rates of growth for CO2 emissions and four
indicators of economic activity for the four years preceding the introduction of the EU
ETS (2000-2004) and for the three years of the trial period (2004-2007). The four
indicators of economic activity are:
1. Gross domestic product (GDP), a common measure of economy-wide activity
2. Gross value added (GVA) for the sectors of the economy included in the EU ETS
(mostly, electricity generation and industrial activities),
3. GVA for industrial activities alone, and power generation (which is measured in
physical units instead of GVA).
4. Power generation expressed in total MWh produced
GDP is used although this indicator includes more economic activity than is encompassed
by the EU ETS, but it is a readily available and commonly used indicator that is thought
to have an important influence on CO2 emissions. The GVA of the combined power and
relevant industrial components of GDP comes closest to capturing the EU ETS sectors,
although it would miss combustion facilities greater than 20 MW thermal that are located
in sectors not included in the EU ETS. The GVA for industry alone and the generation of
electricity reflect the activity levels of the two main subcomponents of EU ETS
emissions. The striking feature of Figure 2.1 is the change in the growth in CO 2
emissions before and after the EU ETS in contrast to the corresponding changes for the
several indicators of economic activity. In the four years prior to the introduction of the
EU ETS, CO2 emissions grew at an annual rate of about 0.8% per annum; in the three
years since the introduction of a CO 2 price, emissions have declined very slightly even
though economic growth was strong. Figure 2.2 shows both the evolution of observed
CO2 intensity per unit of GDP from 2000 through 2007 and also the counterfactual
expected from a continuation of the 2000-2004 trend into the policy period.
The intensity observed during the policy years of 2005-2007 is not only below the trend
but also below the intensity levels observed in any of the earlier years. Figure 2.3 projects
ETS emissions assuming that the growth in economic activity and the trend in CO2
intensity were the same within the ETS sectors as they were for the German economy as
a whole. Actual ETS emissions are also shown and the hatched area represents the top-
down estimate of abatement. The distinct flattening of emissions growth, observed in
2005-2007, may have had some other contributing factors, but it is hard to imagine that
the CO 2 price did not play a role, given the general belief that economic activity and CO2
emissions are closely linked.
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Figure 2.2: Observed and Counterfactual Emissions Intensity
Source: German government, DEHSt
The yearly pattern that is observed during these years is precisely what economic theory
would predict. There was a perceptible drop in emissions as the CO2 price was integrated
into production decisions. Once that adjustment was made emissions continued to grow
in some relation to GDP growth. In Germany, CO 2 emissions declined by 2.8% from
2004 to 2005 when real GDP rose by 0.8%. In subsequent years of the trial period,
emissions rose by 0.8% and 2.0% while GDP rose by 2.9% and 2.5%. If the pre-policy
emissions trend had prevailed, CO 2 emissions would have increased by 1.1%, 3.2%, and
2.8% in those three years, at rates that were slightly greater than the rate of GDP growth,
as had been the case during the 2000-04 period.
Anyone familiar with the evolution of EUA prices over the years 2005 through 2007 will
question why the abatement indicated in Figure 2.3 would be greater in 2007, when the
EUA price was near zero, than in 2005 or 2006, when an average price near €20
prevailed. In response, two reasons can be adduced for placing less confidence on the
annual amounts than in the estimate for the period as a whole. First, the estimates reflect
a straight line projection of the pre-2005 intensity trend, as readily seen in Figure 2.2,
when, in fact, the actual counterfactual intensity may have been higher or lower
depending on weather and other factors. Such annual variation can be readily seen for the
years 2000-2004 around a back casting of the intensity trend. Thus, in the absence of a
carbon price, the counterfactual intensity could have been higher in 2005 and 2006 than
shown on Figure 2.2. In fact, given the succession of two colder than normal winters, in
2004-05 and in 2005-06, and an intervening warmer than usual summer, not to mention
very high natural gas prices, a higher counterfactual intensity is likely. This would imply
greater abatement. Moreover, the opposite weather conditions and lower natural gas
prices occurred in 2007 and could have caused the counterfactual intensity in 2007 to be
lower.
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Figure 2.3: German Emissions and Estimated Abatement for all ETS sectors based
on GDP C02 intensity
Source: DEHSt
A second reason for focusing on the three years as a whole is the departure of reality
from many of the assumptions common in economic reasoning. Not all investments in
abatement are reversible; that emission reductions pursued during high EUA prices in
2005 and 2006 with an eye to the expected (and realized) higher 2008 CO2 price would
not be shut down or reversed when the EUA price fell temporarily to zero in 2007.
Examples of irreversible and reversible abatement can be found in the power industry.
Improvements in the efficiency of power generation that may have been realized in 2005
and 2006 with a view to the longer-term EUA price would not have been reversed in
2007. Similarly, contract considerations and the common lags in production decisions
would be other reasons not to expect an exact correspondence between carbon prices and
abatement. That being said, the more intensive utilization of gas-fired power plants at the
expense of coal-fired units for supplying the spot market is readily reversible, so,
consequently, a greater reliance on coal-fired generating units, and commensurately less
abatement, would be expected in 2007 as the EUA price fell.
These considerations suggest that some confidence can be placed in the cumulative totals
yielded by this type of top-down analysis without being overly concerned about the
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annual distribution of abatement. Accordingly, Table 2.1 presents four alternative
estimates of CO2 emissions abatement in Germany due to the EU ETS. The data and
representative calculations made to arrive at these estimates are presented in the appendix
of this paper. The counterfactuals are based on emissions intensities that are formed by
dividing carbon emissions by an observed activity index (such as GDP) over the years
2000-2004 and then extrapolating this intensity into the years 2005-2007. The difference
between the emissions counterfactual and observed emissions forms the estimate for
emissions abatement. The abatement estimate for all EU-ETS sectors uses a
counterfactual based on gross value added (GVA) for the industry and power sectors
since it most closely matches the EU-ETS sectors; the calculation is also done using
emissions intensities based on economy-wide GDP which is an intuitive, but less accurate
measure. The power sector abatement uses counterfactuals based on power generation
and GDP.
Table 2.1: Emissions Abatement Estimates
Basis of estimate (million tons) 3-yr abatement Annual reduction
All ETS Sectors using counterfactual 121.9 40.6 (8.1%)
based on GVA Intensity
All ETS Sectors using counterfactual 85.5 28.5 (5.7%)
based on GDP Intensity
Power sector only using counterfactual
based on generation intensity
Power sector only using counterfactual 56.7 18.9 (3.8%)
based on GDP Intensity
Source: Authors' calculations
These estimates vary according to the denominator that is chosen to form the intensity
statistic. The important point is not the exact number but the general magnitude. The data
on emissions and economic activity in Germany all point to emission reductions,
coinciding with the introduction of the EU ETS and probably caused by the CO 2 price.
The numbers developed here would suggest abatement of 5%, and perhaps higher, of
what CO2 emissions from EU ETS installations in Germany would reasonably otherwise
have been (around 500 million tons).
There are reasons that these numbers may overstate the magnitude and for that reason
they are referred to as upper-bound estimates. For instance, all energy prices rose
significantly during these years independently of the CO 2 price, and these increases
would have led to reductions in emissions for the same reasons that we would expect a
that a CO2 price would have been expected to have an effect. Similarly, the German
government has undertaken a series of measures aimed at reducing energy use, and these
probably led to energy use and emission reductions independently of the EU ETS. Still, it
is doubtful that all of the indicated reduction in CO 2 emissions could be attributed to
these other confounding factors. The effect of renewables in this regard will be discussed
in Chapter 7.
2.3. Estimating and Illustrating Abatement in the Power Sector
Top-down approaches that depend on aggregate statistics can be supplemented by more
focused analyses that concern single sectors where models and data are available. These
analyses incorporate more of the sector-specific details that cannot be captured in
aggregate numbers and which always raise questions about the reliance that can be placed
on top-down estimates. This part of the analysis relies on a simulation model, "E-
simulate," that was originally developed at the University of Leuven, Belgium and that
has been subsequently calibrated to fit historical data from 2003 and 2004.2 E-simulate is
a cost minimization model that simulates European electricity generation dispatch on an
hourly basis over an annual cycle at the power plant level. The entire system is organized
as a set of interconnected 'zones', each of which corresponds to specific country or group
of countries, of which Germany is one. Transfers of electricity can occur among zones
subject to the pre-specified limits on interconnection capabilities. The demand for
electricity is specified by zone for each hour of the year, and the model solves for the
least cost dispatch of generation to meet electricity demand in all zones, given daily fuel
prices. E-simulate operates as a linked hourly stacking model, in which the dispatch of
available generation is determined by power plant characteristics and fuel prices. By
adding a cost for CO2, the stacking order is usually changed in favor of lower CO2-
emitting generation with consequent abatement for most levels of demand. The results
reported below reflect the German zone only, although those results flow from running
the entire model including interzonal transfers that involve Germany.
2 More detail on the model can be found at Voorspools (2004) and Delarue, Ellerman and D'haeseleer,
(2008).
As explained more fully in Delarue, Ellerman, and D'haeseleer (2008), CO 2 abatement
through fuel switching depends principally on two factors: The availability of natural-
gas-fired capacity and the prices of coal and natural gas. For any given stock of
generating capacity, the availability of lower emitting gas-fired capacity that could be
substituted for higher emitting coal-fired generation will depend upon the hourly load,
which varies by daily, weekly, and seasonal cycles, and fuel prices. For instance, if
natural gas prices are very low relative to those of coal, all gas generation will be
committed anyway and there will be little to no capability to reduce CO2 emissions by
fuel switching. Similarly, when fuel prices favor coal-fired generation over gas-fired
generation, as is usually the case, the amount of gas-fired generation available for
switching will depend on the hourly load. On peak hours, when demand is high, most of
the gas-fired generating capacity will be already committed, so that there will be less
low-emissions capacity available for switching. The interplay of these factors and their
effect on abatement is illustrated in Figure 2.4, which shows the effect of both load and
fuel prices on abatement by the German power sector in response to the observed EUA
price.
Due to the lack of demand data for 2007 when this analysis was performed, generation
and abatement are shown only for 2005 and 2006. Load is shown by the black line at the
top labeled generation (right axis in terawatt-hours/day), and it displays a decided
seasonal variation reflecting the winter-peaking characteristics of German power demand.
The reddish, dashed line at the bottom shows daily abatement (left axis in 000 tons/day)
due to fuel switching. As can readily be seen, there is a distinct seasonal pattern to
abatement. There is more in the summer, when there is less demand on the system and
when more uncommitted gas-fired generation is available for switching.
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Figure 2.4: Summary of Abatement Drivers
Source: Model results, Bloomberg
The effect of the CO2 or EUA price (green line to be read on left axis in euro per ton) also
depends on fuel prices. The blue band reflects the distribution of the fuel switching
points, which depend on power plant efficiencies and fuel prices. A switching range or
distribution can be defined as the EUA price at which available unused gas-fired capacity
would be substituted for coal-fired generation. This distribution is defined on the low side
by the substitution of the most efficient and lowest cost unused gas-fired capacity for the
least efficient and highest cost coal-fired capacity in service; on the high side it is defined
by the substitution of the least efficient and highest cost gas-fired units for the most
efficient and lowest cost coal-fired unit. Thus, the further the EUA price penetrates into
this range, the greater the abatement will be, all else being equal.
This fuel price effect can be observed in comparing the abatement in the summer of 2005
with that in the summer of 2006. As shown in Figure 2.4, EUA prices were well within
the fuel-switching band during the summer of 2005, in contrast to the summer of 2006
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when EUA prices were frequently below the switching band. When summarized over the
two years by quarters, the seasonal pattern of abatement and the influence of these other
price factors can readily be seen.
Table 2.2: Estimate of abatement in the German power sector
Mn tons 2005 2006 2007
Jan-Mar 0.85 0.34 0.1
Apr-Jun 2.98 1.61 0
Jul-Sep 3.61 1.81 0
Oct-Dec 0.87 1.05 0
Full year 8.31 4.81 0.1
Source: Model calculations
Assuming little to no fuel switching in 2007, this bottom-up estimate indicates abatement
of 13.2 million tons in the power sector alone for the three-year trial period, or about 1%
of what emissions would have been in the ETS sectors in Germany (about 1.5 billion
tons), and it can be taken as a lower bound for the reasons previously explained.
Further illustrations of power sector behavior in response to a CO 2 price
The extent and timing of fuel switching and the effect on abatement is illustrated more
directly in Figure 2.5, which shows model results for 2005 alone. Abatement is driven by
gas displacing coal and lignite, and the vertical lines show the percentage variations in
generation from gas- and coal-fired power plants in response to actual EUA prices.
Hourly abatement is shown by the black dots measured on the right axis in tons per hour.
Most fuel switching and abatement occur during the summer when more unused gas-fired
capacity is available. But there is also a pronounced variation within each season
reflecting daily and weekly cycles in load. These are chiefly the week-day peak hours,
when much of the gas-fired capacity is committed, regardless of fuel or CO2 prices.
Similarly, there are hours during the winter, when switching and abatement occurs,
chiefly during the week-ends and at night when the load is relatively lower. The
concentration of abatement during the summer occurs, because there are more hours with
unused gas-fired capacity due to the lower load over-all during the summer months. As
shown on the graph, fuel switching varies between 2% and 12% given EUA and fuel
prices.
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Figures 2.6 and 2.7 below provide a comparison of dispatch in the Germany electricity
system in 2006, when there is no CO2 price (2.7) and when the actual CO2 price (2.6a) is
simulated. Figure 2.6 also shows hourly abatement. There are perceptible changes, but
the change is not as great as hoped or feared by various parties. With the observed CO 2
price, natural gas fired generation penetrated more deeply into the maroon, hard coal
band and hard coal displaced some lignite (yellow band) mostly on week-ends during the
summer, when the highest abatement tends to be observed. Lignite and hard coal still
provide an important part of base-load power and natural gas and oil-fired units still
provide the peaking capacity regardless of season.
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Figure 2.7: Model Results of Abatement and Load without a carbon price
Source: Model results
The influence of load, fuel and CO2 prices on abatement in the German power sector can
be summarized as in Figure 2.8 below. The figure aggregates the hourly abatement and
generation data points into daily values to correspond to EUA and fuel price data. Then
these daily values are ordered from highest to lowest abatement and expressed as a
relative measure from 100, for the day with the greatest abatement, to 0 for the day with
the least abatement. Linear trend lines are added for easier analysis. High abatement
tends to coincide at low loads when the system offers the most flexibility for fuel
switching, gas/coal ratios are low which results in a low switching band, as well as high
EUA prices so that the EUA price is most likely to fall within the fuel switch band. As
load and natural gas prices increase relative to coal; when EUA prices decline, abatement
diminishes. As the slopes of the trend lines show, load has more effect than the price
factors, and the gas/coal price ratio is as important as the EUA price in determining
abatement.
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Figure 2.8: Days in 2005 ordered from high to low abatement
Source: Model results, Bloomberg
The estimates of abatement provided here compare well with the estimates for the EU as
a whole that have been provided by Ellerman and Buchner (2008, p. 34), when they
speak of between 50 and 100 million tons, or of 2.5% to 5%, for each of 2005 and 2006.
The similar top-down estimate for Germany that is developed in this paper tends to the
upper end of this range on a percentage basis; however, they also clearly include other
factors, particularly in 2007, which cannot be attributed to the EU ETS. Minimum
estimates can be provided by realistic bottom-up simulations of the power sector alone.
The calibrated EU-wide simulation that is reported more extensively in Delarue,
Ellerman and D'haeseleer (2008, p. 29), and used here, provides an estimate of 13 million
tons for Germany (and 53 million tons for the EU as a whole) for the years 2005 and
2006 combined. These minimum estimates are approximately 1.3% of both German and
EU-wide emissions, on the unlikely assumption that the only abatement in response to the
C02 price was in the power sector and in that sector only by fuel switching. The exact
number or percentage is not as important as the evidence that there was some effect,
although it was modest in keeping with the emission reduction ambitions of the trial
period of the EU ETS.
2.3 The implications of Short-term Effects on Long-term Investment Decisions
The bottom up models provide a crucial link for the long-term investment decisions. The
E-simulate model in its least cost hourly approach also calculates the marginal fuel at
every hour. Assuming that the marginal plant will have to compete with the existing
generation fleet and does not directly replace other capacity, the marginal fuel can be
taken as an indication for the number of hours the new plant will be dispatched, and
hence the capacity factor. This is one of the most sensitive variables in the discounted
cash flow model that will be introduced in more detail in Chapter 4.
Taking the results from the bottom-up model, the hours per marginal fuel can be
aggregated to find how many hours per year coal is the marginal fuel on the grid.
Table 2.3: Marginal Fuel Calculations for the year 2006
2006
Min. up
Fuel Conversion type time (hrs) Raw Count Percent Adjusted for Ramp Time
Coal Rankine multifuel 12 5369 61.29% 61.28% Coal
Gas Rankine gas 4 1085 12.39%
Gas Brayton-Rankine SS 4 106 1.21%
Gas Brayton-Rankine DS 4 1902 21.71% 38.72% Gas, Diesel,
Gas Brayton 1 55 0.63% Fuel oil
Diesel Diesel 1 2 0.02%
Fuel oil Rankine oil 4 241 2.75% L _I
Source: E-simulate model
Table 2.4: Marginal Fuel Calculations for the year 2005
2005
Min. up
Fuel Conversion type time (hrs) Raw Count Percent Adjusted for Ramp Time
Coal Rankine multifuel 12 5459 62.32% 62.31% Coal
Gas Rankine gas 4 609 6.95%
Gas Brayton-Rankine SS 4 51 0.58%
Gas Brayton-Rankine DS 4 2224 25.39% 37.69% Gas, Diesel,
Gas Brayton 1 65 0.74% Fuel oil
Diesel Diesel 1 7 0.08%
Fuel oil Rankine oil 4 345 3.94%1
Source: E-simulate model
Aggregating the raw numbers for the year 2006, this results in 61% of hours with coal as
the marginal fuel. If the numbers are adjusted for the minimum up times required, the
numbers do not change significantly and 61.3% of the hours find coal as the marginal
fuel, while 38.7% of all hours find gas as the marginal fuel. This analysis forms the basis
for using a capacity factor of 0.4 for the peak gas dispatch in the following chapters. If
one assumes that the short-term marginal cost of a gas plant is higher than the marginal
coal plant after adjusting for the price of carbon, this results in a low capacity factor for
gas and hence a significant deterioration of the profitability of a gas investment.
Repeating this analysis for 2005 shows very little difference even though the carbon
prices had been significantly higher, suggesting that the impact of the carbon price is not
significant.
These results will be discussed in more detail in the context of fuel spreads and capacity
factors used in the investment model in Chapter 5. Before the long-term investment
model will be discussed, however, the following chapter will look more broadly at
evidence of changing investment behavior as a consequence of the introduction of carbon
emissions trading in Europe and specifically in Germany.
3. Long-term Investment Effects and Evidence of
Changing Investment Decisions
The short-term effects of carbon pricing have been established in the literature using
bottom-up models such as the one presented in the previous chapter; however, methods
for estimating the long-term impacts of carbon pricing on power investments are much
less established. This is in part due to the fact that there are merely four full years of data
available in Europe. Furthermore, three competitive and game theoretic considerations
make companies less willing to fully and openly disclose their actual assessment. Firstly,
individual plant-level cost structures and portfolio merit orders are kept secret from to
avoid being underbid by competitors. Secondly, companies want to maintain a strong
bargaining position vis-ai-vis the regulators and the European Commission to ensure that
the power plant and company receives the highest possible carbon credit allocation.
Thirdly, the real options embedded in the company's growth portfolio are dependent on
specific regulatory and market outcomes related to carbon and power prices which means
that investment plans are contingent on expectations of price and allocation effects.
While the next three chapters will discuss these elements in more detail, this chapter
provides a literature review of long-term effects and presents empirical data that shows
how Germany has not followed the European trend of investing in gas-fired generation
assets.
3.1 Literature Review
Given the 25-40 life of power plant investments, any changes to the generation portfolio
will be of a gradual nature and investment decisions are unlikely to be influenced by
short-term movements in price. The long-term effect of emissions trading on power
investments is contested among industry experts. Depending on whether one classifies
CO2 emissions trading as a marginal change of fuel prices or a long-term change of the
industry, the conclusion of the effect of emissions trading on long-term investment
decisions is either only seen on short-term fuel change and marginal carbon abatement or
the structural change of investment viability in specific generation technologies. The
literature on the long-term investment effects of carbon trading for the power sector is
still relatively scarce. The literature review shows that so far analysis has focused on
normative approaches, cost distortions as well as real options and examples will draw
both on carbon emissions trading as well as experiences from the US SO 2 trading system.
Normative Approaches
Brewer (2005) uses surveys to assess the level of knowledge within firms prior to Phase I
of the EU-ETS and assesses company actions to increase their preparedness to emissions
trading, which, at the time of the study was still surrounded by significant uncertainty.
Pinske (2007) uses the large database of carbon related information compiled through the
Carbon Disclosure Projects to assess the intentions of a global sample of companies in
dealing with the consequences of a carbon price. Curiously, companies had very similar
responses regardless of them being European firms or outside of a mandatory carbon
trading framework which is explained with the focus on global climate change policy in
general rather than carbon pricing in specific. Several other studies look at the
preparedness of specific industries in specific countries, including Paulsson and von
Malmborg (2004) in their analysis for Sweden.
Cost Distortions on a Macro and Firm level
A second set of studies has analyzed the changes in cost structures and distortions
introduced through elements of carbon emissions pricing. The first seminal papers on the
economic implications of emissions trading rules stem from Weitzman (1974) and
Atkinson and Tietenberg (1987). A crucial part of this analysis is to assess the impact of
different emissions allocation mechanisms. Ellerman, Joskow and Harrison (2003) reflect
on experiences, lessons and considerations from emissions trading in the US. Busch,
Weinhofer and Hoffman assess the carbon performance of the 100 largest US electricity
producers as well as potential carbon exposure of these companies. Neuhoff, Martinez
and Sato (2006) discuss the impacts that the national allocation plans (NAP) have on
market prices, operation and investment decisions and provide numerical examples to
support these findings. Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) review the literature on similar
issues faced by other emissions trading schemes such as the US SO 2 system. Schleich and
Betz (2005) review the impacts that allocation mechanisms have on incentives to
innovate. Oberndorfer and Rennings (2007) assess the competitiveness impacts on the
companies that result from the EU ETS. Ellerman (2006) provides insights on distortions
from new entrant and closure provisions while Ellerman and Buchner (2006) assess
abatement and allocation effects in their preliminary analysis of the EU-ETS. Sekar,
Parsons, Herzog and Jacoby (2006) give a concrete example how carbon price and policy
scenarios present tradeoffs between coal generation technologies. Hoffmann (2007)
assesses the effects of carbon trading on investment decisions through expert interviews
and finds limited impact on investment or R&D decisions. Hepburn, Grubb, Neuhoff and
Mathes (2006) review the fundamental basis for auctioning within the EU-ETS.
Real Options in Capital Investment Decisions
Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) apply a real options methodology to analyze the impact of
carbon price uncertainties in future power plants. Their study of the Finnish power sector
comes to the conclusion that there are two specific real options embedded in the capital
allocation problem, the option to wait and the option to alter the scale of the operations
and the impacts of allocation methodologies on these options is discussed in detail.
Yang and Blith (2007) provide a comprehensive model for assessing risks and
uncertainties of policy risk and carbon price uncertainty on the long-term investment
decisions of power generators. Uncertainty is modeled as short-term volatility, longer-
term random walk price variations (Brownifan motion), as well as climate policy
uncertainty that leads to step changes in price after price shocks are triggered by discrete
changes to the market. The authors then provide a comprehensive modeling approach
using real options to quantify the value of flexibility and to determine the optimum
investment point given the expectations on the carbon regime. In addition to looking at
the changes in merit order between coal and gas investments and the associated carbon
pass-through, Yang and Blith also consider the development of CCS technology and
calculate carbon price thresholds required to incentivize CCS development.
3.2. Evidence of Investment Decisions Pre- and Intra- Phase I
Before developing the investment model to analyze long-term effects, this section will
assess recent empirical evidence of trends within the industry two years into the second
phase of European carbon trading. Both the current generation portfolio and announced
investment plans are taken into consideration to see whether there are any early
indications of structural change in the power generation industry.
Method and sources of empirical evidence
Empirical evidence is gathered from annual reports, analyst reports and technical reports
of the large power generation companies. Germany has four large incumbent utilities,
E.On, RWE, Vattenfall, and EnBW (referred to as "Big 4"), which define the
oligopolistic structure of the European and especially German markets. Aside from
aggregating data from the large four companies separately, another data source is the
German economics ministry, which collects and publishes aggregated statistical data
series. Furthermore Platts has developed a database of EU-15 wide power plant
construction and investment announcements, which has been tracking the sector since
2002. Moreover, the German association of electric power and water companies, BDEB,
publishes a database of power projects and tracks the projects from announcement,
through the licensing stage and into the construction and completion stage. While this
data is only available as a current snapshot of the industry rather than a time series, the
data is the most detailed and most up to date. Initially a timeseries had been constructed
based on data from mid-term investment plans of the Big 4 players. This idea had to be
abandoned, though, due to the large reporting inconsistencies between companies,
changes in regional aggregation and changes in time scales for projects.
European Trend towards Gas strong, Coal stalled briefly by EU-ETS
Investment in power generation assets in the EU has been focused on incremental builds
in gas, coal, wind and waste. The macro data seems to suggests two very clear price and
policy trends. In gas, the growth of expected capacity can be explained with the
expectation of more stringent carbon regulation while the drop in activity from 2006 to
2007 most likely is a reflection of the high gas price and the higher gas to coal price ratio.
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Figure 3.1: EU 15 Power Plants Planned and Under Construction
Source: Platts Database
It is exactly this ratio which seems the most intuitive explanation of the recent increase in
coal build, although the total capacity of coal (at 43 GW in 2007) is about half of the total
planned gas capacity (still at 87 GW, down from 97 GW in 2006). The sharp drop in coal
plant plans in 2004 is likely a reflection of the negative impacts that a carbon price would
have on the relative profitability of coal. The clear preference for gas and renewables
over coal is evident from this EU 15 chart; however it stands diametrically opposite to
power plant build in Germany which is shown in Figure 3.2. German planned generation
capacity investments are 70% coal and 20% gas for projects that are currently being built
or already have a license. For projects in the planning or approval stage, 63% are coal
while 33% are gas. This could reflect trends towards more gas, but still shows a clear
preference for coal that runs contrary to investment trends in the rest of Europe. To
explore possible reasons, it seems pertinent to look at the ownership structure of
generation assets in Germany and specifically the dominance of the four largest utilities.
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Figure 3.2: German Planned Generation Capacity by Fuel and Completion Stage
Source: BDEW
The Big 4 players account for two-thirds of the total power generation assets in Germany,
owning the majority of coal and nuclear assets. The companies are, however, minority
holders in gas and renewables.
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Figure 3.3: Ownership of assets by Fuel Type of Big 4: E.ON, EnBw, RWE,
Vattenfall
Source: Company Annual Reports, Federal Economics Ministry
The Big 4 own almost all lignite, hard coal and nuclear assets, they own only 42% of
renewable assets, a large part of which is hydro, and 35% of natural gas and oil assets.
Historically, the Big 4 have been best positioned to make high capacity, large capital
investments and smaller local utilities. They have focused on the lower upfront cash cost,
smaller capacity investments that serve distributed communities. Hence marginal
investments from these companies are likely to be geared towards large baseload
investments such as coal.
Generation Portfolio hardly changes during ETS-Phase I
Unsurprisingly due to the large life times of power investments, the overall generation
portfolio of the Big 4 did not change significantly before and during ETS-Phase I.
Marginal increases in gas capacity and marginal decreases in nuclear capacity have let
the total generation capacity of the Big 4 companies hover around 90 GW in the five
years between 2003 and 2007.
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Figure 3.4: Generation Capacity of Big Four
Source: Company Annual Reports
Significant Investment Plans before Phase III
Investment in additional generation capacity is driven by several factors. Firstly, several
coal power plants are reaching their planned retirement age and are likely to be replaced.
Secondly, power demand has risen steadily over the past decade requiring new capacity.
As incremental demand is currently being met almost entirely from non-fossil sources,
there is the need for baseload capacity. Thirdly, the nuclear phase-out laws of Germany
will retire nuclear power completely by 2021, although future administrations could
decide to revoke this law as early as 2010, should neither the Green Party nor the Social
Democrats be part of the ruling coalition following German elections in September 2009.
While the current economic crisis will dampen demand, the long-term need for additional
capacity has resulted in the industry increasing investments and pledging significant new
investments in the next years.
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Figure 3.5: Investment in Generation Capacity by German Power Companies
Source: BDEW
Following the German reunification, power companies have invested an average of 1.7
bn Euros annually in new generation while spending an average of 3.6 bn Euros annually
on transmission and other capital investment projects. Following the projections of the
power company as reported by the industry association, BDEW, this trajectory is set to
increase through to 2010 when power companies expect to invest close to 7 bn Euros in
generation capacity alone. In real terms this amount of investment has not been seen
since the mid 1970s, and then again in the mid 1980s, when a significant part of the
current generation fleet was built.
A more detailed view on the technology preference of these investments is provided by
the BDEW, the German power and water utility industry association that publishes up-to-
date statistics of all announced power plant announcements and traces projects through
the regulatory pipeline. As of January 2009, 14.5 GW of new capacity were either under
construction or had received building licenses or building pre-clearances. This represents
16% of the current Big4 generation portfolio and 11% of the total German power
generation assets. An additional 9.7 GW of capacity is currently going through the
approval process; 10.2 GW of capacity have been announced to be built with operation to
begin before 2014, while 3.1 GW of capacity are planned to come to operation after
2014, 1.2 GW of projects are currently conducting citing studies.
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Figure 3.6: Planned German Capacity Build by Construction Stage
Source: BDEW
The 24.3 GW of currently planned capacity represents 27% of the current Big4 portfolio
and 18% of total German generation assets while the entire 38.8 GW of capacity that is
either being constructed or in the pipeline represents 43% of the Big 4 and 29% of the
entire German capacity. As shown in Figure 3.2 more than two thirds of this investment
will likely be done in coal.
Table 3.1: Planned Capacity Pipeline compared with Big 4 and Total German
Assets
Capacity As Percentage of As Percentage ofCapacity Current Big4 total German
(GW) Portfolio Generation Assets
Capacity being Built as of Jan 2009 14.5 16% 11%
Capacity in the Pipeline 24.3 27% 18%
Sum of Capacity being built and in pipeline 38.8 43% 29%
Sum Big 4 Capacity 2007 89.8
Sum Germany Capacity 2007 134.3
Source: BDEW, Company Annual Reports, German Federal Economics Ministry
These statistics underline the fact that many power generation companies are in the
process of deciding which technology to use for additional capacity. Even if the European
economy is heading towards a long recession and power demand is slowing over the
coming quarters, this investment decision will have to be revisited as soon as the
economy will recover and demand growth returns to historic trajectories of 1-2% per
annum. The following chapters will serve to outline the investment model to provide an
understanding for such preference, and they will analyze how carbon trading has both
price and allocation effects on the long-term investment decisions.
4. Power Plant Investment Model and Analysis of Key
Uncertainty Parameters
Long-term investment decisions by their very nature are characterized by significant
uncertainties. As presented in the previous chapter, more capacity needs to be built over
the medium-term, yet companies must decide in which generation technology and what
fuel to invest. While commodity markets express price expectations for the next several
years through forward curves, no long-term indicators exist over the entire expected life
of a power plant. A frequent tool used when trying to forecast the future is to develop
scenarios that will reflect optimistic, pessimistic, or the base case assumptions. However,
scenarios make it hard to judge the relative likelihood of these scenarios occurring, which
is why a probabilistic approach is chosen. Hence, rather than using static price
assumptions, a time series of historic data is fitted to a distribution. Using Monte-Carlo
methods, 10,000 samples are then drawn randomly from the distributions of the different
variables.
Over the next three chapters, the investment model and its main variables will be
presented and the model outcomes discussed in detail. The effects of the carbon price on
the power sector can be divided into two separate drivers, price and allocation. This
chapter will introduce the discounted cash flow model of a coal and gas investment while
the full discussion of price effects will be done in Chapter 5. The allocation effects will
be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
4.1. Representing Uncertainties in Investment Model
The centerpiece of calculating the profitability of power generation investments is the use
of a discounted cash flow model both for a coal and gas power plant. The model
calculates the net present value (NPV) of the investment over the project lifetime, as well
as the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project cash flows. More formally, the NPV is
the sum of the future cash flows discounted using the weighted average cost of capital,
specified mathematically as:
T
NPV= R, (1)
=(1 + i
with ti = project construction start;
T = end of lifetime of investment which is 25 years for gas plant and 40 years for
coal investment;
i = interest rate which is set at the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)
The internal rate of return is defined formally as the interest rate, i, that would make the
NPV of the project zero and can be solved directly from the NPV formula or iteratively.
The investment model is implemented in Excel and sample results can be found in the
Annex II.
Technical assumptions for the Coal Investment Model
There are several technical assumptions required for the coal investment model. To the
extent possible, the assumptions are taken directly from the same sources that were also
used for the bottom-up E-simulate model, so as to provide the biggest sense of cohesion
between the short-term and the long-term models. The overall specifications assumed for
the coal power plant are a Rankine 500 MW coal plant, with a 40 year life span, running
at a full load efficiency of 40%, and a capacity factor of 0.85 to produce 3.7 TWh of
power per year. The full technical assumptions are provided in the table below:
Table 4.1: Technical Assumptions for Coal Plant
Technical Assumptions for Coal Plant:
Source E-simulate and model calculation
Technical assumptions for the Gas Investment Model
Like the coal model, the assumptions used in the gas investment model use the same
underlying sources that were also used for the bottom-up E-simulate model, so as to
provide the biggest sense of cohesion between the short-term and the long-term models.
The overall specifications assumed for the gas power plant are based on a 300 MW
Brayton-Rankine gas plant, with a 25 year life span and a full load efficiency of 52%.
The gas power plant can be dispatched in two different means, either at a high capacity
factor bidding for base load power prices or at lower capacity factors bidding for peak
load power prices. When dispatched as a peak power plant with a base case assumption
of a capacity factor of 0.4, it produces 1.1 TWh of power per year, while a base load
configuration would use a base case assumption of 0.85. The capacity factor of 0.4 has
been chosen, based on the marginal fuel analysis shown at the end of Chapter 2. Given
that the German power grid has coal as the marginal fuel for significant parts of the year,
these assumptions might be very optimistic as will be shown in the following two
chapters. The full technical assumptions for a peak load configuration are provided in the
table below:
Table 4.2: Technical Assumptions for Gas Plant
Technical Assumptions for Gas Plant:
PlaSource:nt Siz  MW 300
Cap. Cost: mn EUR/MW 0.4133
Heat Rate (Btu/Kwhe) 6562
O&M Cost Fixed (mn EUR/MW) 0.02475
O&M Cost Variable (EUR/MWh) 1.5
Carbon Emissions Factor (t Cboth2 / MWh) 0.350
CapTherecity Factor 0.40
Power Produced per year ( Forn KWh) 1051.2
Lifetime 25
Full Load Efficiency 52%
Source: E-simulate and model calculation
Financial assumptions used in both Investment Models
There are a number of standard finance assumptions that have been used both for the coal
and gas power plant investments. For example, the model assumes that the investor
already holds a diversified portfolio and the credit rating agency does not penalize the
investor's credit rating for the investment decision taken.
Table 4.3: Finance Assumptions used both in coal and gas plants
Source: E-simulate and model calculation
The tax rate of 28.3% and a depreciation rate of 6.3% were taken from an Ernst&Young
(2007) publication on representative power investments in Germany. It is assumed that
the power plant will be financed using 60% debt and 40% equity. Given the current credit
environments, it is questionable whether utilities could actually receive 60% debt
financing for new projects, a point which disadvantages coal investments versus gas due
to the higher capital intensity. While current investment projects will potentially be
delayed or require a higher equity portion (which erodes returns), we assume that the
current scarcity of large credit financing facilities is a temporary effect.
4.2. Uncertainty of Commodity Input Prices
As seen from the short-term effects discussed in Chapter 2, fuel prices take a central role
in determining the marginal fuel choice. The price distribution hence becomes one of the
central assumptions for any long-term investment model, having a large impact on the
projected economic returns of a power plant over the coming 25-40 years. The long-term
price forecasts through simulation are required, given that the forward curves, observed
in the commodity markets, seldom reach beyond 5 years into the future and forward-
selling of power tends to occur only one to two years into the future.
Distribution Fitting:
The method for the probabilistic analysis of the data requires the historical data to be
fitted to standard distributions, from which the Monte Carlo Simulation can then
randomly draw samples. The distribution fitting was performed using MATLAB as well
as the distribution fitting software Crystal Ball 11.0, a software produced by Oracle that
allows very easy and rapid fitting of large datasets and allows correlations between
datasets to be defined when used together with Monte Carlo methods. Both Crystal Ball
and MATLAB fit the data sample to a wide variety of possible distributions and provide
the statistical goodness of fits as output upon which the most adequate distribution is
chosen. After determining the optimal distribution using the Crystal Ball software, the
data was then put into MATLAB, which allows for further analysis and good graphical
representations of the fitted distributions.
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot from Distribution Fitting Software- Crystal Ball
Source: Crystal Ball 11.0 Software
Before discussing the commodity price distributions in detail, there is the question of
what time periods to consider for the analysis. The carbon price has only existed since
2005, hence leading to the use of the entire available data for Phase II delivery, since the
trial period is now over and prices are very unlikely to ever be this low again. The
upcoming chapter 5 on price effects will also show how in the first half of the decade
before the introduction of the EU-ETS, gas seemed the more profitable fuel thus
justifying new builds. Using 2001 to 2004 commodity prices, gas looks especially
appealing when adding a hypothetical carbon price and scenarios are shown for carbon
prices of 8 and 15 Euros per ton.
For the commodities coal and gas, longer ranging price distributions were used; this
assumes that gas and coal are large regional or global commodity markets that are not
impacted by the presence of the carbon price. While this is definitely the case for the
global coal markets, the same assumption is made for gas, since the development of
global LNG terminals is rapidly integrating global gas sub-markets into a single,
interconnected market similar to the oil market. The table below also shows alternative
commodity prices that have been used in other scenarios outside of the base case. Had
recent gas and coal prices been used, the returns would have been lower since the mean
values of the commodity costs would have been higher. Since a strong argument of this
thesis is that fuel prices are potentially dominating carbon price effects, the choice of a
viable fuel price series is crucial to the analysis. What is important to notice, however, is
that gas prices have seen relatively large swings in tandem with oil prices several times in
the last decades, while the recent coal price spike is a phenomenon that has not been seen
so far. Hence all long-term coal price projections are lower than those of gas, but in the
interest of taking a conservative approach in the analysis, relatively high coal prices have
been chosen nonetheless. Another crucial factor rests with long-term delivery contracts
that are often not fully disclosed for commercial reasons. The analysis is based on
forward prices seen on the market, assuming that companies could potentially sell into
these markets, if that was possible. Lower fuel prices would necessarily lead to higher
returns and potential distributions are shown in the table below.
Table 4.4: Overview of data inputs for price distributions
Data Series: Units Mean Distribution Type
Gas-2000-2008 EUR/TJ 4244.59 Log-normal
Gas-2005-2008 EUR/TJ 5860.60 Normal
Coal-2000-2008 EUR/t 57.56 Log-normal
Coal-2005-2008 EUR/t 74.38 Log-normal
Carbon: 2005-2008- Dec 09 contract EUR/t 20.40 Normal
Power-Base: 2000-2008 EUR/MWh 36.64 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008 EUR/MWh 51.51 Log-normal
Power-Peak: 2000-2008 EUR/MWh 70.97 Log-normal
Power-Peak: 2005-2008 EUR/MWh 71.76 Beta
Source: Model inputs. For a detailed listing of all distributions refer to Annex I.
Coal Price
Several coal prices were taken into consideration as the basis for the price distribution
used in the coal investment model. The German import prices for hard coal are reported
on a monthly basis, which is not sufficiently frequent to use in conjunction with daily
carbon and power prices. Another option would be to use the standard world market price
for coal, such as the API #2 ARA coal price series. The drawback of this price series is
that it does not consider transportation costs (although this could be adjusted for) and that
the time series available for use showed gaps for any data prior to 2005. Using a
European or global market price will ignore any benefits that backward integrated players
reap from access to cheap resources, yet assuming that utilities have the option of selling
the coal into forward markets removes any distorting effect on dispatch. The price series
used for the analysis was a daily coal index developed by Merrill Lynch that reflects an
average of OTC coal prices from independent brokers for the global coal price (CIF
ARA). The index is based on forward contracts that roll over quarterly. This index has
been scaled to the German monthly price data to reflect the prices including
transportation costs faced by power companies while capturing the daily volatility in
prices. As the prices used for the distribution are from January 1, 2001 until March 10,
2009. The fit of the price data is not very good in statistical terms, due to the high price
fluctuation and the coal price spike observed in 2008. Using MATLAB's distribution fit
tool, one of the best fits for the data sample is a lognormal function with p = 3.93889 and
a = 0.3404. The data histogram and fit is shown below:
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Figure 4.2: Histogram and fitted line for coal dataset
Source: MATLAB output
Gas Price
The German gas market lacks full transparency in that most power utilities have signed
long-term off-take agreements with gas providers under confidential terms for prices that
are often linked to oil price movements using a proprietary formula. The gas data that is
published by official sources is the monthly German border gas import price before taxes.
Given the large uncertainty of the real prices, the data series used is the Zeebrugge one
month forward gas price in the same time interval as the coal price (from 2001 onwards).
This price series is used assuming that power utilities continue to have the opportunity to
either use gas in their operations or to sell it on the short-term forward market if that is
more attractive. The distribution that best fits the historical data series is a Gamma
distribution with the factors alpha= 9.77765 and a beta= 457.276. The histogram and
fitted line from the Crystal Ball software is shown below:
Figure 4.3: Histogram and fitted line for gas dataset
Source: Crystal Ball 11. 0 Software Trial Version
Carbon Price
The carbon prices used for this analysis are completely based on Phase II pricing. The
Phase I prices have not been included since the first phase carbon credits were not
bankable across phases and are not relevant to investment decisions going forward. The
European Commission has reaffirmed numerous times its commitment to carbon trading
beyond 2012, regardless of whether a post-Kyoto agreement is struck. The complete
smooth continuation of carbon trading beyond 2012 is also reflected in the fact that the
price spreads between 2012 and 2013 futures contract have significantly narrowed. While
the Phase I carbon price showed large volatility, Phase II carbon has been trading in a
relatively stable range. Only very lately has the carbon price dropped below the EUR 15
mark, reflecting negative demand growth from the power sector, due to the wider global
economic recession.
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Figure 4.4: Phase II Carbon Price History
Source: European Climate Exchange (ECX)
The carbon price is normally distributed around a mean of 20.40 Euros with a standard
deviation of 4.09, as can be seen from the graph below. The data is based on the
December 2008 delivery contract quoted on the European Climate Exchange (ECX), one
of the main exchanges both for carbon and power in Europe. After the expiration of the
December 2008 contract, the price series is based on the December 2009 contract, the
next available contract. While this distribution is an accurate representation of the very
sparse history of price data, it is more difficult to say how reliable this price distribution
is for estimates going forward.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution Fit of Carbon Prices
Source: MATLAB software
Given the difficulty in predicting future carbon emissions prices, the sensitivity analysis
below compares the profitability of gas and coal investments given different carbon and
power price scenarios. The sensitivity analysis assumes the carbon and the power price
on the axis as the base starting price in the first year of generation, 2011, and then an
annual price increase of carbon and power in line with an expected inflation rate of 1.5%.
The base case scenario assumes 85 % free allocation until 2012 and then full auctioning
from 2013 onwards, in line with the current state of the European Commission Emissions
Trading Directive. The sensitivity analysis shows an investment in a gas asset that has a
positive net present value over the life of the project at an initial power price of 50
EUR/MWh at zero carbon price to a power price of 95 EUR/MWh at a carbon price of
150 EUR/t.
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity Analysis of Gas Investment NPV to Power and Carbon Price
Source: Model calculations
Similarly, the sensitivity of a coal power investment in net present value terms can also
be shown as a function of carbon and power prices. The sensitivity analysis merely
graphically portrays the sensitivity of coal investments to the carbon price. The coal
investment is highly unprofitable at mid to high carbon prices if the power price is low,
but conversely, the investment is very profitable in a high power price, low/mid carbon
price scenario. The line of break-even (the transition between cream and green colors)
runs from a zero carbon price at a power price of 33 Euros/MWh to a carbon price of 130
EUR/t at a power price of 150 EURIMWh.
All scenarios assume full auctioning beyond 2012 and the base case assumptions for all
the other technical and financial indicators. The scenario analysis also keeps the fuel
prices constant for every carbon price, thus treating carbon and power prices as fully
independent. There actually exists a relatively high correlation between power, carbon
and fuel prices, but this will be explored in further detail in following chapter on price
effects.
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity Analysis of Coal Investment NPV to Power and Carbon Price
Source: Model calculations
In summary, the difference between the coal and the gas investment profitability reflects
the different emission intensity characteristics of the fuels. Thus in a low carbon price
scenario, the net present value of the coal investment is positive at a lower power price.
In a high carbon price scenario the net present value of a gas investment turns positive at
a lower power price compared with the coal plant investment. These insights are intuitive
and reflect how these fundamental characteristics are reflected in the investment model.
Power Price
Power prices in Europe differ on a country-by-country basis and large-scale arbitrage
between the markets is not possible due to the physical boundaries of power transmission
over long distances and across borders. Power prices in Germany have historically been
in the mid to high range compared to bordering European states. Regions with lower
power prices such as France or the Scandinavian states served by Nordpool, profit from
the low cost power generation assets from nuclear and hydropower.
Since the introduction of emissions trading, power prices in Germany have increased
significantly as both coal prices rose and high oil prices resulted in gas prices (oil and gas
prices are linked, although both have significantly dropped lately). Furthermore this is
due to a significant part of the opportunity costs of carbon being passed on to rate payers,
leading to significant windfall profits for the power utilities3. Perhaps surprisingly, power
utilities were not forced to repay these profits through windfall taxes. Given the long-
term trajectory of further reductions on the carbon cap in Europe and the rapid movement
towards full auctioning, the actual or opportunity costs will remain an integral part of the
power price.
Given that power prices going forward are going to reflect carbon prices, there is little
value in using pre-2005 power prices as a basis for the price distributions. The available
and useful data sources for power prices are the daily power prices quoted by Bloomberg.
Several prices are updated on a daily basis, including the day ahead, month ahead, and
year ahead prices. The day ahead prices are very sensitive to sudden disruptions in power
generation leading to very high price volatility; yet, they account for only a small part of
the total power generation capacity. Instead, the forward month price was used as this
price series correlates most closely with the monthly and quarterly commodity prices
used is the analysis.
Having discussed the choices made for the main input variables to the investment model,
the following two chapters will apply this model to differentiate the price effects and the
allocation effects of carbon trading on investment decisions.
3 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) on a basis of several assumptions calculates that windfall profits in
Germany alone in Phase II could reach 32.2 bn Euros. Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen (2006) estimate passed-
through rates between 60%-100% for the German and Dutch markets.
5. Price Effects and Reconciling Fuel Spreads with
Model Results
Having discussed the different inputs into the investment model, this chapter will discuss
the price effects of emissions trading. In the second half of this chapter empirical fuel
spread data will be introduced as a cross-reference for the model results presented in this
thesis. These methods will be used to strengthen the point that the base case assumptions
for gas, although initially compelling, might be too optimistic, which would explain the
preference of coal investments as seen in the German market.
5.1 Price Effects of Carbon
Power plants are designed to either meet base or peaking capacity with the large, capital
intensive investments suited for meeting baseload demand at high capacity factors. For
the two investment options presented in this thesis, coal is dispatched as baseload, while
the combined cycle gas power plant can be dispatched either for base- or for peakload;
peak power prices are significantly higher to give an incentive for higher variable cost
capacity to be deployed. There are several different power prices depending on the time
to delivery, but these fundamentally reflect the costs of meeting marginal demand. Given
that it becomes impossible to ramp up base capacity at minute's notice, the very short-
term power prices are very volatile and can be very high to incentivized spinning reserve
or flexible, but expensive, peaking plants to come to the market. Data quality varies
significantly between European countries; for example, the Spanish market operator
publishes the bids of the hourly electricity auctions, while in Germany only a daily value
of base and peak power is reported on Bloomberg. Given the lack of dynamic pricing
data, it is not possible to directly map the hourly dispatch data calculated from the
bottom-up model to prices seen on the exchange.
The investment model calculates the distribution of returns and net present values as
already elaborated in Chapter 4. Beginning with coal, the base case profitability is based
on a capacity factor of 85% and base power pricing, since coal power plants are never
dispatched for peaking capacity.
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Figure 5.1: NPV distribution of Coal investment under base power pricing
Source: Model calculations
Assuming full auctioning for a coal plant, the NPV of the investment using power prices
sampled from the base power price distribution has a mean of 141.81 million Euros with
a mean IRR of 13.6%. The analysis shows that only with a probability of about 36.7% the
investment results in negative returns; however it is important to note that very
conservative assumptions have been made in choosing to use coal and carbon price
samples and using only the total correlation of the entire sample set, rather than having
the Monte Carlo simulation pick discrete pairs of carbon and coal prices actually
observed historically. This results in price pairs of high carbon and low power prices
being drawn that have not been observed in reality, but that are theoretically possible.
Choosing only historically observed paired samples would reduce the tails of the
distribution, providing more mass around the mean and make this distribution more
leptokurtic. The following chapter will explore how different potential carbon allocation
scenarios can increase the value of an investment in coal by shielding the cost impacts
from carbon.
5.2. Gas Investment: Baseload versus Peak Dispatch
When looking at the combined cycle gas plant investments, there are two major
assumptions one can make about the dispatch pattern. Either the gas plant can serve
baseload demand, meaning that base power prices will be used and capacity factors that
are equally high as for the coal plant (85% in the base case) are used. Otherwise, the gas
plant can be dispatched to meet peak demand, which means that higher power prices are
earned, yet the capacity factor is much lower (assumed at 40% in the base case).
As can be seen in the chart below, the outcome of these two scenarios shows that it is
more profitable to have the plant meet peak demand, assuming that the capacity factor of
40% can be attained. The distributions and means of both gas plant setups are shown
below. Furthermore a hybrid model between the two scenarios is likely. For example,
given the seasonality of power demand with highest demand in the winter and lowest
demand in the summer, the operator could decide to dispatch the gas plant to meet
baseload demand during the winter months while dispatching the plant to meet peak
demand in the summer months. This flexibility also gives the operator the opportunity to
react flexibly to gas price volatilities.
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Figure 5.2: NPV distribution of Gas investment under baseload pricing and
CF=85% as well as peak power pricing and CF=40%
Source: Model calculations
5.3. Spread Analysis- Reconciling Market Fuel Spreads and
Model Results
One of the key analysis metrics used in the power industry are the spreads that a company
is earning for generating power. These spreads make several simplifying assumptions on
the production efficiencies of the power producing assets and take the heat rates of the
fuels into account. The simple spreads only account for marginal costs and show the
profit that is earned above the operating costs, i.e. the profits that will be retained to repay
the capital costs. Positive spreads indicate that it is more profitable to generate power
than to purchase the electricity from the market. For the analysis below API #2 coal
prices, Zeebrugge European gas prices and the closest end-of-year carbon prices have
been used.
There are several different spreads, each with a distinct name to specify its use:
a. (Dirty) Dark Spread- Refers to coal without adjustments for carbon
= Power Price - (Coal Price/ Fuel efficiency)
b. Clean Dark Spread- Coal spreads adjusting for carbon prices
= Dirty Dark Spread - (CO2 intensity of coal*C0 2 price)
c. (Dirty) Spark Spread- Refers to natural gas without carbon adjustment
= Power Price - (Gas Price/ Fuel efficiency)
d. Clean Spark Spread- Gas spreads adjusting for carbon prices
= Dirty Spark Spread - (CO 2 intensity of gas*CO 2 price)
These spreads are quoted on Bloomberg, however, there is only very limited historic data
available for these spreads. Hence, the spreads were recreated from first principles using
long-dated price series. While the absolute value of the spreads is interesting, the real
question for making a relative investment decision between coal and gas is the movement
of the difference of the dark and spark spreads.
The figure below gives a long-time series of these spreads from the end of 2000 until
February 2009. The figure shows the difference between the dark and spark clean spreads
(i.e. carbon-price adjusted). The clean spreads were calculated twice, once using the spot
price for carbon and once using the higher Phase II carbon prices. The pre-2005 carbon
price obviously is zero, however, later in this chapter two scenarios will show these fuel
spreads if a carbon price of 8 or 15 Euros per ton is assumed for the years 2000-2004.
The difference between the spot and Phase II fuel spread charts below emerges in late
2006 and 2007 when the Phase I carbon price tended to zero while the contract with
December 2008 delivery did not move significantly. Obviously, using the higher Phase II
price favors gas since it has a lower carbon intensity, although the overall difference is
not very large and is not explicitly shown in the figure below. Using this analysis it
becomes possible to count the number of days when the clean dark spread (coal-based) is
above the clean spark spread (gas-based) to see how many days coal dominates gas a
more profitable fuel.
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Figure 5.3: Clean Spreads for Coal and Gas from 2000-2009
Source: Bloomberg, ECX model calculations
Table 5.1: Spread Analysis
Clean Spreads
using Phase II Clean Spreads and Spot
Carbon Carbon
2005-2008 2005-2008 2000-2004
Days with Positive Spread 707 745 617
Total Days with Data 969 914 939
Fraction Coal Dominance 72.96% 81.51% 65.71%
Source: Model calculations
The outcome is striking. The large majority of days show a higher profitability of coal
plants versus gas plants. The data is presented as five day rolling averages to smooth the
data, in order to make it more easily legible on a graph with a long time series, although
the calculations have not been smoothed.
Another very interesting feature emerges when taking a closer look at the data. There are
clearly seasonal effects of commodity prices that can be seen in the data; the dark-spark
spread is lower during the summer months, coinciding with the seasonal dip in gas prices
often turning negative, which serves as an indicator to operate a gas plant. Moreover, the
absolute value of the spread difference indicates that coal plant investments have actually
become more profitable versus gas since the introduction of carbon emissions trading;
this is a slightly counter-intuitive result but with great explanatory power for the recent
announcements of new coal builds, as outlined in Chapter 3 of the thesis. While in the
time before carbon emissions trading, it was more profitable to operate coal power plants
versus gas plants on 65.7% of trading days. During the emissions trading scheme this
increased to 81.5% of trading days, showing a clear preference for coal over gas and
exemplifying the coal/gas fuel price ratio increasing.
5.4. Cost Pass-Through
An implicit assumption made in all the spread calculations so far is that the carbon price
is passed on in full to the power price and hence the consumer. Reinaud (2004) discusses
the distorting effects that partial cost pass-through effects could have on the EU-ETS
sectors including the power sector. Sijm, Neuhoff, Chen, 2006 find evidence of carbon
cost pass-through between 60%-80% in Phase I for power installations that received free
allocations. One of the central arguments for auctioning is that the pass-through of the
carbon price will be reflected in consumer choice reacting to these higher prices. The
sensitivity analysis below shows the impacts on the base case profitability of the power
and gas investments, assuming baseload dispatch for coal and peak dispatch for gas. This
is done by subtracting the C02 cost element from the power price, which is deducting the
carbon coal C02 costs from the base load price or deducting the gas C02 costs from the
peak power price. In the case of full (100%) pass through, the companies fully pass on
the carbon price through the power price charged to the consumer. In the scenario of
125% pass-through, the power prices are increased by 25% of the carbon price, if the
utilities were to theoretically charge the consumer beyond the actual carbon cost incurred,
which is a situation sometimes seen in monopolies. The table shows how large the impact
of the carbon price is on the profitability of coal investments relative to gas investments
and is a reflection how geared the coal investment is towards the carbon price.
Table 5.2: Cost Pass-Through effects on coal and gas plants
Coal NPV- Gas NPV- Coal- Gas-
Pass-Through Base Peak NPV/Equity NPV/Equity
75% -40.2 116.3 -0.2 2.3
1000/0 141.8 128.7 0.7 2.6
125% 259.2 139.3 1.3 2.8
Equity
Capacity Plant Life Invested (mn
Assumptions (MW) (years) EUR) Pricing CF
Coal 500 40 192.1 Base 0.85
Gas 300 25 49.596 Peak 0.4
Source: Model Calculations
Adjustments for Capital Cost:
The analysis so far has not taken into account the capital cost, looking only at the
marginal operating cost. In the investment model, the capital cost is reflected through the
constant annual loan repayment charge on the debt, which both pays debt interest and
principal. In the base case of the model, a debt level of 60% is assumed. The capital cost
for a gas plant are assumed at 0.41 million EUR/ MW of capacity while the costs for a
coal fired plant are more than twice that level at 0.96 million EUR/MW capacity. To
attain a cost per output, the annual debt service charge is divided by the amount of energy
generated. The energy output of the plant is highly dependent on the capacity factor and
increases linearly with a decrease in the capacity factor, since the capital charges need to
be recovered over fewer units of output. The table below shows the resulting capital cost
charges for a number of capacity factors, while the model calculations use 85% as a base
case scenario.
Table 5.3: Capital costs and capacity factors
Capital Cost Per Technology
Capacity Coal Gas
Factor (EUR/MWh) (EUR/MWh)
85% 2.03 1.01
80% 2.16 1.07
70% 2.47 1.22
60% 2.88 1.43
50% 3.46 1.71
40% 4.32 2.14
Source: Model calculations
The fuel spreads shown above in figure 5.3 are thus the main measure for the investment
profitability excluding capital cost. Hence, to adjust the fuel spreads for the capital cost
the difference in clean fuel spreads must be 1.02 EUR/MWh or higher for coal to be more
profitable than gas (assuming a capacity factor of 85%, where the 1.02 EUR/MWh is the
difference between the capital cost for coal of 2.03 EUR/MWh and gas of 1.01
EUR/MWh). Adjusting for capital costs still leaves coal the more profitable fuel in more
than 78% of days over the last four years, assuming spot carbon prices or almost 70% of
days when applying Phase II carbon prices.
Table 5.4: Capital adjusted spreads
Clean Spreads
using Phase II Clean Spreads and Spot
Carbon Carbon
2005-2008 2005-2008 2000-2004
Days with Positive Spread 707 745 617
Total Days with Data 969 914 939
Fraction Coal Dominance 72.96% 81.51% 65.71%
Fraction Coal Dominance-
Capital Cost Adjusted 69.45% 78.34% 58.25%
Source: Model calculations
Looking at these numbers it seems counter-intuitive why anyone would argue for the
construction of gas-fired power plants at any point back to the year 2000, when large
amounts of gas-fired capacity were built. However, adjusting the pre-2005 figures for the
carbon prices at levels that had been anticipated prior to the start of the EU-ETS, it
becomes apparent why a strong argument for gas existed. This is visualized in the graph
below that shows in blue the pre-Phase I 2000-2004 spreads with no carbon price; all data
is shown as a 50 day moving average for better legibility. The straight line is the trend
line and shows that on average it is more profitable to burn coal over the entire time
period. The magenta line assumes an 8 Euro per ton carbon price being added between
2000 and 2004. This shifts the trend line by about 4 Euros, showing a preference for gas
on average over the entire period. If the hypothetical carbon price is increased to 15
Euros per ton to the 2000-2004 fuel spreads (shown in green), an even clearer preference
for gas over the entire period emerges. Hence assuming a hypothetical carbon price for
the years 2000-2004 results in a vertical move of the spreads of about four Euros if a
carbon price of 8 Euros/ton is assumed and seven Euros for a carbon price of 15
Euros/ton compared to the baseline of no carbon price.
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Table 5.5: Clean Spreads using spot prices for carbon
Clean Spreads
using Phase II 2000-2004 with Hypothetical
Carbon Clean Spreads and Spot Carbon Carbon Prices
2005-2008 2005-2008 2000-2004 8 EUR 15 EUR
Days with Positive Spread 707 745 617 406 260
Total Days with Data 969 914 939 939 939
Fraction Coal Dominance 72.96% 81.51% 65.71% 43.24% 27.69%
Fraction Coal Dominance-
Capital Cost Adjusted 69.45% 78.34% 58.25% 36.53% 24.07%
Source: Model calculations
With a hypothetical carbon price of 8 Euros, the number of days prior to Phase I, when
coal was more profitable, is reduced to 43% or 37% when adjusting for capital cost,
assuming a capacity factor of 85%. Moreover, when adding a hypothetical carbon price,
the number of days when coal is the dominant fuel further falls to 28% or 24% when
adjusting for capital cost. This makes a very compelling argument for building gas plants,
even when assuming that gas plants will be dispatched only when fuel spreads are
favorable for gas.
Looking at these results and assuming a Phase II carbon price, the number of days when
coal is the more profitable fuel is reduced from 82% to 73%. However, given that
historically the pass-through rates of the carbon prices into the power price are very high,
the actual power price would likely be higher in an environment of elevated carbon
prices, and this would marginally benefit coal which has lower marginal costs. Such
results explain the preference for gas fired investments in the run-up to the EU-ETS,
while the Phase I numbers also explain the recent preference for coal-fired investments.
Overall, this analysis shows how large fluctuations in fuel prices dominate any moderate
changes in the carbon price.
Using these figures as more realistic capacity factors for the investment model, it
becomes clear why the preference for new investments is coal and not natural gas.
The table compares the initial base case assumptions from the analysis with the updated
capacity factors based on the spread analysis. The analysis shows the preference for a
coal in a baseload dispatch (IRR = 13.6%; NPV/equity = 0.74) over gas in a peak
dispatch, if the capacity factor is reduced to 0.25 (IRR = 11.1%; NPV/equity = 0.31), as
well as gas in a baseload dispatch, if the capacity factor is reduced to 0.8 (IRR = 13.3%;
NPV/equity = 0.54).
Table 5.6: Capacity Factor Sensitivity Analysis
Coal Gas- Base Gas- Peak
Capacity Factor 0.85 0.85 0.8 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25
NPV 141.8 38.9 26.6 128.7 92.5 53.89 15.27
NPV/MW 0.28 0.13 0.09 0.43 0.31 0.18 0.05
NPV/Equity 0.74 0.78 0.54 2.59 1.87 1.09 0.31
IRR 13.6% 15.8% 13.3% 28.6% 23.4% 17.4% 11.1%
Capacity 500 300
Equity 192.1 49.596
Source: Model Calculations
The case for showing the strong effect of fundamental fuel prices is furthermore
exemplified when looking across the commodity price distributions and calculating the
carbon price required to equalize short run marginal costs. The figure shows the
components of the marginal price, namely fuel costs, variable O&M costs, as well as
carbon costs in dark gray. The resulting carbon price that would equalize the operating
costs is the solid line that is traced onto the secondary Y-axis on the right. The above
figure splits the price distributions for gas and coal into deciles on the X-axis in opposite
directions; the lowest 10% of gas prices are being shown at the left together with the
highest 10% of coal prices. This gives an overview of the most extreme values that the
carbon price can take, i.e. the lowest possible gas price paired with the highest possible
coal price moving to the highest possible gas price and the lowest possible coal price.
Historically, gas and coal prices have slightly correlated (R squared of 0.13), making the
extreme cases highly unlikely. The figure shows that a carbon price would need to rise
above 100 Euros/ton in order to give an economic incentive for fuel switching, if gas
prices are above their 7 0 th percentile and coal prices are in their lowest 30 th percentile.
The table shows, for example, that if gas prices being in their lowest 30th percentile and
coal prices in their 70th percentile, a carbon price of 28 Euros/ton would exactly equalize
the short-term variable costs of both plants and give rise to fuel switching on the margin.
The analysis furthermore shows that if gas prices are in their lowest 20th percentile, fuel
switching will always occur (if there is sufficient spare capacity in the system) as seen by
the negative resulting carbon prices.
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Figure 5.5: Commodity Price Distributions and related carbon prices
Source: Model Calculations
Thus the price effects show that fuel prices can dominate carbon price effects and,
furthermore, that only a combination of both effects provides the full explanation of
technology choice. In addition to the price effects of carbon there are also allocation
effects that will be discussed in the following chapter.
6. Allocation Effects
Having introduced the investment model and the price effects seen from carbon, this
chapter will provide a framework for quantifying the impact of allocation effects on coal
and gas investments. The investment model will be used to exemplify, how policy can
change the value of generation projects and can affect the choice between coal and gas
fired power plants. Furthermore, fuel spread analysis will be used to explain why coal
investments in Germany are clearly favorable under significant free allocations. Gas
investments are more profitable in a full auctioning scenario assuming high capacity
factors, which are currently not seen in the market, though. Hence, full auctioning
provides an incentive to lower the power sector's emissions intensity while free
allocations will clearly favor coal investments. All these effects can, however, be
dominated by fuel price effects as will be shown in this chapter. After Chapter 2 had
looked more closely on the short-term effects from fuel switching driven mainly by
marginal cost, this chapter relates to new generation assets, where both operating and
upfront capital costs have to be taken into account.
6.1. National Allocation Plans and Methods of Setting the Cap
There are several possibilities for disbursing carbon emissions permits within a cap and
trade system. The two most widely used mechanisms are free allocation (also known as
grandfathering) and auctioning of these rights. Several hybrid mechanisms exist, for
example, auctioning a proportion of the credits while grandfathering other portions of the
total cap. A third mechanism of allocation is to create a sector-specific or technology-
specific benchmark that allocates credits according to a specific carbon intensity (tons/
MWh generated); any credits required above this benchmark would need to be purchased
in the free market. This chapter will discuss the impacts of such provisions, while also
quantifying the impact of so-called new entrant and closure rules that were initially part
of drafts for the German National allocation plans but have now been removed for any
new investments in generation assets.
6.1.1 Grandfathering
Phase I of the EU-ETS (2005-2007) made almost exclusive use of grandfathering as an
allocation mechanism where carbon credits were allocated at zero cost based on historic
emissions. Boehringer (2005) provides a formal analysis of optimal allocation using
grandfathering. In Germany installations were grandfathered 97.09% of baseline
emissions, a total amount that turned out to be higher than actual emissions, hence
driving the carbon price to transaction cost levels in the Euro cent range towards the end
of Phase I in 2007. In the second phase of the EU-ETS, power installations were
allocated 85% of historic baseline emissions. The European Council decided in
December 2008 that the power sector will move to full auctioning in Phase III with
limited exceptions. Firstly, national allocation plans will be substituted with a central
allocation mechanism that greatly harmonizes overall allocation and rules out any special
provisions, such as the German ex-post adjustment that had been used in the first trading
phase. Secondly, grandfathering to the power sector will be replaced by full auctioning of
emissions permit "taking into account their ability to pass on the increased cost of C02"
(EC Commission, 2008). The European Commission treats the energy intensive
industries differently, since they stand in international competition in often highly
commoditized markets with very slim margins. Hence, the EU Commission foresees
grandfathering to being reduced to 30% by 2020 with a complete phase out aimed by
2027 (European Parliament, 2008).
6.1.2 Auctioning
In the first phase of the EU-ETS, auctioning was hardly used. The EU Commission
allowed national governments to auction up to 5% of the cap and 10% in the current
Phase II. In Phase I, only four member states auctioned emissions credits amounting to a
total of 0.13% of the total allocation. The use of auctioning in the second phase is higher,
but the total volume is far below the potential volume of 10% of EU-ETS wide
emissions. As stated in the amended EU Emissions Trading Directive (EC 2008A), full
auctioning in the power sector is encouraged from 2013. Transitional free allocation for
modernization of electricity generation can be granted to countries with weak integration
into the network interconnected system, where in 2006, 30% of electricity was produced
from a single fossil fuel or where the 2006 gross domestic product per capita at market
prices did not exceed 50% of the average gross domestic product per capita of the EU
(ibid).
Auction theory constitutes a large field in applied economics and a thorough treatment of
the topic would go beyond the scope of this thesis. For an in-depth discussion of
auctioning experiences from different sectors, Klemperer (2002) or Jensen (2004) can be
referred to. The seminal report by Matthes and Neuhoff (2007) expands on the different
auction design aspects,too, and can also be applied specifically to the EU-ETS with its
concrete recommendations. A short overview of their ten main design parameters and
recommendations is provided in this table below:
Table 6.1: Design Variables and recommendations for auctions
Design Variable Matthes and Neuhoff Recommendation
1. Participants All entities with registry account; have financial players to
provide liquidity
2. Number of Rounds Single round simple; no need for revealed preference in multi-
round auction, secondary market prices indicate demand
3. Clearing Price Simple uniform price auction for simplicity and participation
Calculation of unsophisticated bidders
4. Auction Frequency At least monthly, best weekly
5. Allowance Transparent and consistent application of procedure and
Distribution across taking into account hedging demand. Explicit statement if
auctions low price is politically unwanted
6. Reserve Price Using reserve price close to previous trading day increases
transparency and protects integrity from unexpected
outcomes due to technical failures
7. Margin Payments Credit posting of e.g. 10% of bid value to reduce
counterparty risk and ensure seriousness of bids
8. Auction Host Find institution already operating in similar business
9. Bid Restriction No restriction on bids, but limit bids to certain share number
of allowances
10. Monitoring and Market monitoring similar to other commodity markets with
Transparency regular publication of aggregate data.
Source: Matthes and Neuhoff (2007)
Reflecting auctioning the investment decision model
Auctioning impacts the absolute and relative profitability of power generation
investments by adding a cash cost of carbon emissions credits to the operating costs of
the power plants. Given that coal plants have higher carbon intensities than gas plants, the
impact of auctioning on coal investments is higher than those for gas. Several scenarios
quantify the differences between auctioning and grandfathering; these are shown later in
this chapter.
Assuming the Phase III provisions remain in place as they currently stand, the cash cost
of auctioning to the power plant operator will be significant. The underlying assumption
is that auction will not impact the carbon price and hence the original price distribution is
used in the model. Furthermore, this approach assumes that the price that power
companies have to pay in the auctions will be the average price of the rights in the
secondary market, i.e. that prices will not be artificially high or low from arbitrage
between the auctioning and secondary markets.
6.1.3 Benchmark
An alternative allocation mechanism to grandfathering and auctioning is to allocate
emission certificates base on benchmarks. Benchmarks define a set emissions intensity
and define a cap by multiplying the benchmark intensity with a variable that describes the
output or size of the industrial operation. The actual benchmark can be set in accordance
with various measures and is often done with the "best available technology" (BAT) to
give companies an incentive to invest in modern and low-emission intensity capital
equipment. In practice, several characteristics can be used as the basis for a benchmark
allocation, as described by Matthes and Neuhoff (2007) including:
1. Historic production using a fixed baseline
2. Historic production using a moving baseline
3. Current production
4. Projected production using some model-based approach
5. Installed capacity
One of the main areas where benchmarks have been used is in the calculation of new
entrant allocations. The use of benchmarks can become very difficult to administer in an
equitable fashion, especially in highly heterogeneous industries; in the power sector the
most widely used benchmarks are either based on installed capacity or power output.
6.2 Impact of New Entrant Rules
One special characteristic of the EU ETS is the set of rules surrounding the treatment of
new entrants. The 2003 emissions trading directive of the European Commission
(2003/87/EC), for instance, allows for the allocation of free allowances to incumbents
that build new capacity. Article 3h of the directive defines a new entrant as an
installation, "which has obtained a greenhouse gas emissions permit or an update of its
greenhouse gas emissions permit because of a change in the nature or functioning or an
extension of the installations, subsequent to the notification to the Commission of the
national allocation plan". Furthermore, the national allocation plans need to disclose the
amount of new entrants that are granted to generating companies. In the first phase of the
EU-ETS, free allocations to new entrants were granted in all participants of the EU-ETS,
expect for Sweden where new entrant allocations were only granted to very efficient CHP
plants and industry. The reserve size as a fraction of the total cap varied substantially
between countries from 0.4% in Poland to 16.7% in Italy. Most countries allocated
emissions based on best available technology standards (BAT). However, there are
several different ways of allocating new entrant allocations, which are classified by
Ahman and Holmgren 2006:
1. Input- or Output Based- Using a pre-determined benchmark of carbon credits
is multiplied either by the input factor, such as capacity, or the output factor, such
as emissions or power generated. Output based benchmarks are usually preferred
since they incentivizes efficient energy generation.
2. Fuel-neutral or Fuel-specific- Using different benchmarks by fuel gives an
incentive to use low-carbon fuels, however, they tend to not encourage
investments in low-carbon fuels.
3. Technology-neutral or Technology-specific- Technology-specific benchmarks
are used mostly to promote specific technologies or to accommodate for the
different conditions in which different technologies are used. Technology-specific
benchmarks have little justification for incentivizing least-cost emissions
reductions.
4. Product-specific or Product-neutral- In this case the product applies to
electricity or heat, and separating these two enables for a harmonization of
electricity incentives (which is easily transportable and tradable across borders)
versus heat which by its fundamental properties is a local product.
Table 6.2: New Entrants in the First Phase of the EU-ETS
Reserve size as Allowance Allocation
Country NER percentage of withdrawn upon metric for new
total cap closure entrants
Austria Yes 1.8 Yes BAT
Belgium Yes 4.0 Yes BAT
Cyprus Yes 0.7 no information BAT
Czech
c Yes Yes BATRepublic 3.1
Denmark Yes 3.0 Yes BAT
Estonia Yes 3.4 no information BAT
Finland Yes 1.8 Yes BAT
France Yes 1.7 Yes Average
Germany Yes 0.6 Yes BAT
Greece Yes 4.3 Yes As needed
Hungary Yes 1.9 Yes BAT
Ireland Yes 1.5 Yes BAT
Italy Yes 16.7 Yes BAT
Latvia Yes 11.5 no information As needed
Lithuania Yes 5.0 no information Benchmark
Luxemburg Yes 12.0 Yes BAT
Malta Yes 26.3 no information BAT
Netherlands Yes 2.6 No BAT
Poland Yes 0.4 no information BAT
Portugal Yes 8.0 Yes BAT
Slovakia Yes 2.3 no information BAT
Slovenia Yes 0.8 Yes BAT
Spain Yes 3.6 Yes BAT
Sweden CHP/industry only 3.2 No BAT
Unitedid Yes Yes BAT
Kingdom 6.3
Source: DEHSt, 2005
The somewhat technical issue of allocation evolved into a much larger debate of market
power, competitiveness and innovation.
Fundamental economic principles suggest that new entrants should not be allocated with
allowances free of charge, since the investment decision should reflect the cost of the
carbon emissions. Free allocations are thus only provided to compensate current
installations for the investment sunk costs made before the ETS came into action and that
are now less profitable in a world that prices carbon (see Harrison and Radov, 2002). EU
member states applied new entrant allocations stating it would be useful for
competitiveness. For example, the large power incumbents could effectively subsidize
their new entrant capacity by reducing the output from the existing fleet or even closing
marginal plants and using the allocation for that capacity for the new entrants (Neuhoff et
al, 2006). Hence, the new entrant rule was seen a means to reduce any potential barriers
to entry that the EU-ETS could implicitly create, especially towards small, independent
power companies entering into the oligopolistic market structure (Reinaud 2005). The
market power argument was first made by Hinchy (1998) in looking at the distortions that
allocation effects can have on the market; incumbents could shield their dominant
position by increasing transaction cost, squeezing new entrants out of the market using
predatory pricing and using the existing generation assets with grandfathered carbon
credits to cross-subsidize new entrant capacity. Betz (2003) challenges the assumed
magnitude of the transaction cost increases, but he in principle agrees with the arguments
made.
Lambie (2002) also draws attention to the financing consequences of large incumbents
versus small new entrants. Capital markets - especially in the current illiquid and
constrained conditions - tend to favor incumbent players with stable cash flows, higher
debt capacities and higher debt/equity ratios. These have access to cheaper cost of capital,
compared to the smaller entrants that will have to rely more heavily on equity financing
and thus face a higher project hurdle rate. Gagelmann (2006) quotes Allen Consulting in
reporting that opportunity costs considerations can become irrelevant, if large incumbents
are in public ownership and political interests dominate investment decisions.
Furthermore, investment decisions could be driven by average costs rather than marginal
costs in an environment of price controls, which is highly prevalent, for example, in the
United States regulated utility areas, but is less applicable to European power markets
that have undergone significant deregulation recently.
Furthermore, new entrant allocations can have a real option effect on first investment
decisions. Following the framework of real options analysis presented by Trigeorgis
(1995) and de Neufville (2003), an incumbent power producer would give up the value of
future allocations by closing a plant. Especially in an environment of high carbon price
volatility, the option value of waiting increases, which leads to slower asset turnaround
and - assuming technological innovation from new investments- slower technical
progress to a lower emissions trajectory generation fleet.
Incentives and innovation effects
While there are distinct economic effects from differing allocation mechanisms, part of
the literature has also focused on the consequences of new entrant allocations on
incentives and innovations. Ashford (2002) focuses on new entrants as drivers of new
innovations and more generally on industries with rapid market entry and higher
competition that foster an environment where differentiation through innovation is
incentivized. Contrary to the inertial effects of new entrant allocations, these credits can
also raise the incentives for market entry which leads to increased production capacity,
although as Ellerman (2006) clarifies this investment subsidy and its effects change
dynamically with the level of the allowance price and are not a fixed amount.
Empirical evidence from other environmental markets
The debate over the efficiency and effectiveness of new entrant allocations has also
occurred in previous environmental markets. The United States, which was one of the
driving forces in the establishment of environmental markets, has several examples.
There the allocations have tended to favor a fixed allocation, often with a large front-
loading of allocations into emissions banks. A single allocation without new entrant
allocations is economically efficient as long as no substantial leakage effects, capital
constraints, or dominant market positions exist; all these assumptions cannot be found to
hold entirely in the EU-ETS. Harrison and Radov (2002) give a concise overview of
several key US emissions trading schemes, highlighting key system design variables such
as allocation method, metrics, and allocation length, an excerpt of which is reproduced
below:
Table 6.3: Allocation and Metrics in US Emissions Markets
Program Allocation Method Metrics
Auction Grand- Update Input- Production. Emissions- Allocation Recipients
father based based based Year
X X X 3-year Existing emitters. Set-aside for
US SO2 average efficiency and renewables
California RECLAIM Max out of Existing emitters. Additional
(SOx, NOx) 4 years allocation for early action
US OTC NOx X X 1 year States covered under the OTC
US ODS Phase-out X X X 1 year Existing emitters
Source.: Harrison, Radov, 2002
Closure Provisions
Several countries, including Germany, made use of a closure provision which states that
power plants that were operated at levels <60% had to be closed, and the allocation for
these assets would have to be surrendered to the national authorities. This, however,
creates perverse incentives to continue the operation of inefficient and thus very carbon
intensive power plants, as discussed succinctly in Ellerman (2006). Matthes and Neuhoff
(2007) argue that the costs of closure of inefficient plants leads firms to continue running
their existing portfolio. This could be avoided by transfer rules that were also
implemented by member states and the European Commission. In Germany, for example,
operators that closed old installations may have "old" allowance transferred to other
installations that are still running (ZuG 2007). Schleich and Cremer (2007) argue that the
degree of the disincentive to invest created by closure rules depends on the amount of
allowances that the company forgoes due to closure. They find that closure rules
combined with grandfathering provides a large disincentive for investment in more
efficient technologies, while closure rules combined with BAT-based allocation would
incentivize closure of high carbon intensity assets. Furthermore, Cames (2007) discusses
the negative impact on innovation from the continued use of older assets, resulting in a
higher plant age and lower efficiency.
6.3 New Entrants in Germany: Quantifying Profitability Impacts
of Policy Change
The effects of new entrants and other design factors introduced within the NAP I have
been analyzed comprehensively by authors such as Ellerman (2006), Matthes et al.
(2005) and Ecofys (2004). The policy surrounding new entrants has undergone several
significant changes all of which are accompanied by impacts on the profitability of
current and future investments. Using the investment model, this part of the thesis will
aim to quantify the profitability impacts of the policy changes. Ahman and Holmgren
(2006) have used quantitative analysis of the value of new entrant allocation relative to
capital and operating costs of coal and gas plants as an argument against new entrant
allocation. They show that the significant value bestowed in new entrant allocations can
significantly distort competition. Rather than draw conclusions on the competitive
effects, this analysis aims to show, how a change in new entrant allocation policy alters
the relative economics of new power plant investments. These results will be assessed as
to how far they contradict or help explain the investment behavior observed in the
European Union and especially in Germany.
New entrant allocations have undergone several policy changes within the German
NAPs. The first phase of the ETS allowed for 100% free allocation of new entrants. The
condition attached to this free allocation was that the new builds had to fulfill a minimum
technology standard (best available technology or BAT). Specifically, this meant that a
new build that began operations after January 1, 2005 would receive up to 0.750 EUA per
kWh and at least 0.365 EUA per kWh for gas powered stations. In the first emissions
trading phase, there was the so-called "ex-post" adjustment of emissions allocations,
which was implemented to prevent power stations from reducing output of power stations
while still receiving the free allocation. Under the ex-post adjustment the allocations for
any power plants would be taken away if the power plants would have been run less than
60% of the average run rate during the basis period. This clause was highly contentious
within the EU Commission and was taken out for the second phase of emissions trading.
The real value from the new entrant allocation, however, came from the provision
guaranteeing 14 years of full, free allocation.
Changes between Phase I and Phase II included the abolishment of the German 14 year
allocation rule and the reduction of power sector free allocation from 97.09% to 85% of
basis period emissions. The new entrant reserve was significantly increased from 3
million tons annually in Phase I to 17 million tons in Phase II.4
Table 6.4: Changes of Allocation mechanisms across phases
Time Phase I (2005-07) Phase II (2008-12) Phase III (2012-20)
Legislative NAP I NAP II Directive
Basis: 2003/87/EC
amendment of Jan.
2008, Council
Decision Dec. 08
Power 97.09% of basis 85% of basis period Full auction for
Sector Cap: period emissions emissions Germany
New 100% free 100% free "no free allocation
Entrants: allocation for BAT allocation for BAT should be made in
plants; ex-post plants, if plants run respect of the
adjustment above 60% production of
electricity by new
entrants"
New 14 years full Abolished Abolished
Entrant allocation, no
Guarantee: digression
New 3 mn tons annually 17 mn tons annually None
Entrant
Reserve:
Source: BMU 2007, EU Commission 2008
The December 2008 European Council Decision clarified the Phase III outlook. Free
allocation to the power sector is abolished with limited exceptions, mostly for recent EU
accession states. The EU Commission justifies the move towards auctioning with
concerns over distortions of competition in the European power markets. At the same
time the Commission grants Eastern European power industries and industrials
continuing free allocations on the basis of relative wealth and global competitiveness of
the markets the companies operate in.
4 The 17mn tons annual Phase II new entrant reserve includes 5 mn tons per year to replenish the depleted
reserves from Phase I.
This policy change has large impacts on the profitability of power investments in that a
large subsidy to operating costs has been removed. The supporting documentation of the
Emissions Trading Directive is relatively clear on the intention to abolish new entrant
allocations and move towards a market of full auctioning with no free allocation (EU
Commission 2008 B). Using the power investment model, three distinct scenarios are
modeled, all assuming baseload power pricing. All scenarios assume new build and take
into account the investment effects, rather than considering only marginal costs of
existing plants.
Scenario 1: Business as Usual from NAP I with NER
The BAT limits set for power plants are upheld and 14 year free allocations are granted
from the first year of operation onwards. Rather than showing this as a likely scenario, it
is used to show the conditions faced by German utilities towards the end of Phase I.
Scenario 2: Business as usual from NAP II is phased out linearly over Phase III
This is an intermediate scenario where the full allocation is held until 2012 and then
phased out over the 8 years of Phase III, when the percentage of total emissions that
needs to be purchased increases linearly per year. This scenario is more stringent than
free allocation, but less stringent than full auctioning.
Scenario 3: New entrant provision abolished; full auctioning from 2013 onwards
This scenario is in line with the current EU Council decision on Phase III emissions
trading. Of the three scenarios, it is the most stringent and results in the lowest mean net
present value of the investments.
Hence, this analysis can quantify the impact of different allocation mechanisms on power
plant profitability. The IRR figures shown below pertain to the returns earned on the
project cash flows and assume that cash flows can be reinvested at the exact same rates of
return over the entire lifetime of the investment; hence, the IRR figure is likely to be
higher than the actual returns observed in reality over the entire project life cycle. The
raw net present values are not comparable, since they are based on plants of different
sizes (capacities), life times and capital costs. Hence they are normalized by the net
present value per million EUR of equity investment to better reflect the value to the
equity investor.
Table 6.5: Summary of Allocation Effects
Scenario: Full Auctioning Free allocation New Entrant
(Scenario 3) phase-out Allocation
(Scenario 2) (Scenario 1)
Coal NPV (mn EUR) 141.81 249.54 578.05
Coal NPV/MW 0.28 0.50 1.16
(mn EUR/MW capacity)
Coal NPV/Equity investment 0.74 1.30 3.01
(mn EUR/ mn EUR)
Coal IRR; CF=0.85 13.60% 20.50% 32.20%
Gas Base NPV (mn EUR) 38.99 69.19 132.36
Gas Base NPV/MW 0.13 0.23 0.44
(mn EUR/MW capacity)
Gas_Base NPV/Equity 0.79 1.40 2.67
investment
Gas Base IRR; CF=0.85 15.80% 22.90% 31.50%
Gas Peak NPV (mn EUR) 128.67 146.16 173.16
Gas Peak NPV/MW 0.43 0.49 0.58
(mn EUR/MW capacity)
Gas_Peak NPV/ Equity 2.59 2.95 3.49
investment
Gas Peak IRR; CF=0.4 28.60% 31.95% 34.60%
Source: Model calculations
Allocation: Financial versus Policy Effects
The fact that allocation affects the profitability of investments is a trivial insight; the
cross-over point, however, from preferring one technology is of policy relevance when
trying to design emissions trading schemes to encourage or discourage certain
technologies.
This analysis shows coal is put at a relative advantage by generous allocation
mechanisms. While the internal rate of return is similar to gas, the investment in coal is
more profitable on an NPV/equity metric. This changes in the full auctioning case where
the baseload gas is the more profitable investment. The gas peaking case is clearly
superior under the assumption that a capacity factor of 0.4 can be attained, but is
dominated by coal if a capacity factor below 0.3 is assumed; the sensitivities were shown
in the previous chapter. Such analysis exemplifies, how free allocations give a relative
advantage to coal and any investor expecting marginal free allocations or facing
uncertainty over the frequency of gas dispatch will choose to invest in coal. The
allocation effects benefit gas investments only when full auctioning occurs and high
capacity factors can be attained. The three scenarios are all presented in the following
graph to clarify the impact of the allocation mechanism on the overall profitability of a
coal investment. In the most generous case with 14 years of free allocations for new
entrants (Scenario 1), the NPV of the coal investment has a mean value of 578 million
Euros. The scenario two the mean is shifted to 249.5 million Euros while in the most
stringent Scenario 3 the mean NPV is shifted down to 141.8 million Euros.
Coal NPV Distributions - Allocation Scenarios Impact Profitability
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Figure 6.1: Profitability impact of allocation scenarios for coal
Source: Model calculation
Similar mean shifting effects are observed in the case of the gas investment. The most
generous allocation would result in a mean NPV of 132.4 million Euros, the second
scenario results in a mean NPV of 69.2 million Euros while the most stringent third
scenario results in a mean NPV of 39.0 million Euros. Given that gas operated utilities
tend to have long-dated gas delivery contracts with non-public pricing clauses, it is very
probable that the gas prices assumed here are overstated and that actual returns are much
higher.
Gas NPV Distributions -Allocation Scenarios Impact Profitability
Mean Full Auctioning Mean Transilon Mean Free Alocation
NPV=39.69= IRR2.9% NPV1=69.2I 2  NPVI32A IRR31.5%
* * * _
6 Free Allocation
o Transition to Audion
* Full Audioning
E Mean 1
m Mean 2
E Mean 3
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
NPV
Figure 6.2: Profitability impact of allocation scenarios for gas
Source: Model calculation
The results from this chapter exemplify the large influence that political decisions related
to carbon emissions trading have on the power market. Although carbon policy has the
most immediate effect, there are, however, other policy areas that also impact the power
sector and carbon policy, as will be discussed in the following chapter.
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7. Impacts of Related Policy Fields
There are two main related policy areas that impact the power sector, namely the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint Implementation (JI) and the Renewable Energy
policy. Ironically, both have direct or indirect effects that benefit the long-term outlook
for coal investments. The CDM can play an important long-term role in mitigating the
necessity for domestic carbon abatement by creating additional, low-cost carbon
reductions in the developing world. If a significantly large amount of relatively cheap
abatement from CERs/ERUs (carbon credits generated through the CDM and JI
respectively) is allowed into the EU-ETS, the effect would be to reduce carbon prices and
favor coal investments, all other things being equal. This dynamic merits a closer look at
the current pipeline of CDM projects (the JI projects have been relatively small in
comparison), as well as an exploration of the CDM as a linking mechanism with other
emerging emissions trading systems such as the American Federal emissions trading
system, should it be established. The effects of renewable energy policy are discussed,
since the abatement has been significant compared with abatement from Phase I fuel
switching (as shown in Chapter 2). Furthermore, this analysis will reconcile the top-down
and bottom up abatement estimates shown in Chapter 2. The impact of renewables favors
coal investments, since the feed-in tariffs for renewables ensures the full dispatch of
renewables, displacing higher variable cost gas generation capacity, as will later be
shown in this chapter.
7.1. The Role of CDM/JI Credits and Linking Emissions Trading
Schemes
Initial observations on the global size of the carbon market and the separate parallel
market structures have already been made in Chapter 1 of the thesis. This chapter will
discuss the CDM and JI credits that are currently being used for compliance within the
EU-ETS as well as national compliance of Annex I nations under the Kyoto Protocol.
International negotiations are currently focused on the next round of global climate
negotiations to be held in Copenhagen in December of this year. A post-2012
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol moves to the center of international climate
negotiations, and the role of the Clean Development Mechanism will play a key role in
the outcome of these negotiations. Hence this chapter will discuss the scheme in more
detail while providing an outlook to the opportunities and constraints that this market
faces from national and regional policy.
The international reductions in carbon emissions that have been negotiated as part of the
Kyoto Protocol can either be reached domestically, or they can be purchased using
international offsets through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint
Implementation (JI). The chief difference between these two schemes rests mainly in the
location that these offsets are being generated in. Joint Implementation credits, called
Emission Reduction Units (ERU), are generated in emissions abating projects in Annex I
countries. To date, this has mainly taken place in former Soviet Union countries, such as
Russia and the Ukraine, although first projects have also been developed in Western
Europe. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) generates Certified Emission
Reductions (CER) credits in non-Annex I countries which are essentially developing and
emerging markets in South America, Asia, and Africa.
The Conceptual Framework of CDM/JI credits
The conceptual background of a CDM or JI project is outlined in figure 7.1. It assumes
that a project in a developing nation with no emissions cap has a certain baseline
emissions level. Through implementing a specific technology, greenhouse gas emissions
reductions are achieved. Rigorous methodology verification ensures that these emissions
reductions are actually "additional", i.e. would not have been attained in a business as
usual scenario. The emissions reductions projects are submitted to the UNFCCC
Executive Board (EB), which then issues carbon credits upon the verification of the
project's credentials. These credits can then be sold to governments to help meet
emissions reductions in developed countries, or they can be sold directly to participants
of cap-and-trade carbon markets such as the EU-ETS.
DevelopinglEmerging Market Carbon credits
$$$ l
Global benefits of Carbon Tradina:
- Developing and emerging
markets benefit from technology
transfer and financial inflows.
- Global carbon emissions
reduced cheaply.
Country with Emissions Cap
Project in developing/emerging market
invests in emission reducing technology;
gains carbon credits
industrial country meets emissions
cap mandated in Kyoto Protocol:
- carbon credit purchase
- domestic action
Figure 7.1: Conceptual background of a CDM project
Source: World Bank, 2009
The CDM and JI projects have to undergo significant project documentation and outside
verification, before the Executive Board of the UNFCCC reviews the projects on an
individual basis. It then decides on whether the projects fulfill all the criteria required to
qualify for an emissions offsetting project and hence will be issued carbon credits.
Elaborating on the procedural steps required would go beyond the scope of this thesis
chapter; however, the main steps are shown in a simplified number of steps that also
highlight the different types of risks faced by projects before coming to fruition:
Project Design Document (PDD)prove mthod & additionality
L~ of Approval fros Desinuated N mtAuthofy
Moniering-Implementation of POD. Submit Monitoring Report
Issuance of Carbon Emission Rights
--
;;
Risks:
*Methodology risk
*UNFCCC rejection risk
*Legal risk: Enforcing contracts
*Legislative risk of host country
Risks:
*Technical risk of project
Risks:
*Counterparty credit risk
*Transfer and settlement risk
Overall Risk
HIGH
Overall Risk
MEDIUM
Over.il Risk
LOW
Figure 7.2: Project Risk Matrix
Source: UNFCCC, 2008
Thus, getting a CDM project from the initial project design document (PDD) to the point
where the credits are issued by the UNFCC is a long and risky process. The earlier on in
the project, the more risk components increase the uncertainty of project delivery.
Projects that are not yet formally registered with the Executive Board of the UNFCCC
carry very high risks. Projects that passed this stage and are in the monitoring,
verification, and certification stages carry medium-sized risks (determined by the
operational risk of the project delivering the projected amount of credits). Once credits
have been issued to a project, the overall risk is low, since the credit can be readily sold
into the secondary market. As a carbon offset project moves along the value chain it
requires several technical, financing, and management inputs which all reduce risks and
add value. This can be seen in the increasing value of the project as it comes closer to
implementation. The pricing of carbon projects is merely indicative and will be
negotiated on a project-by-project basis; furthermore, prices are reported based on
publications and conversations with market participants in 2008 when overall carbon
prices were trading around 20 Euros per ton. Project pricing has contracted as exchange
prices have reduced although anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that this applies more
to later stage projects that tend to trade in tighter spreads with EUAs; the early projects
with high technical risks are, however, priced closer to actual project costs and will thus
not be able to sell for lower levels in non-distressed situations.
Risks: Methodology, legal, host country, counterparty Risks Project Technical risk Market risk
Pricing: USD 4-6 > USD 10 > USD 20
Market Participants along value chain:
Brokers/Traders
Project Developers and Investment Banks Final Credit Users-
Specialized Consultants EU Industry (EU-ETS), global
Verifiers companies
Credit Aggregators (Voluntary market)
Figure 7.3: Project Value Chain, Market Participants and Pricing
Source: UNFCCC, World Bank 2009
Sizing the Carbon Project Market:
The global carbon project market has grown significantly since the first projects started to
be developed, following the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol. Given that the JI market is
only beginning to deliver carbon credits and the CDM market is orders of magnitude
larger, the analysis of the market will focus on the latter. As of February 2009, the
publicly available pipeline of the global CDM projects has reached almost 4500 sites
globally that are expected to deliver almost 3 billion credits by 2012. Most market
analysts apply a significant discount to account for the risks associated with the projects;
however, if just half of the proposed projects get delivered the volume will still be
significant.
Projects by Technology
One of the key objectives of the CDM is to promote technology exchange. Every new
method of generating carbon credits needs to be approved by the UNFCCC before it can
be used to generate credits.
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Figure 7.4: Global CDM Pipeline by Technology (as of February 2009).
Source: UN Riso
Already approved methods can be classified into broader technology types. Most projects
use hydro technologies (1174), biomass energy (676), wind (647), energy efficiency
based on own generation (408) and landfill gas (331). By far the largest projects are those
intended to reduce the most toxic gases. The sulfur hexafluoride projects, HFC and
industrially-sized N20 projects account for 26 percent of the 2.9 bn tons of 'avoided'
carbon even though they only account for 2 percent of the total projects in the pipeline.
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as of February 2009
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Figure 7.5: Global CDM Pipeline by Volume (as of February 09)
Source: UN Risoe
India, China, South Korea and Brazil are the countries where most carbon credits have
been issued thus far, with these four players accounting for almost 90% of the market as
is shown in the figure on the next page:
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Figure 7.6: Largest CER issuers to date (as of February 2009)
Source: UN Risoe
Key Policy Uncertainties relating to the CDM/JI
The European Commission does not tire of reaffirming its support for emissions trading
beyond 2012, regardless of whether or not there will emerge a global consensus for the
continuation of any carbon reduction goals beyond the Kyoto Protocol. However,
significant policy uncertainties for the use of CDM/JI credits within an emissions trading
scheme do exist. For instance, the allowance of CDM/JI projects for compliance within
the EU-ETS has been decreasing from phase to phase. In Phase I, there had been no
limit5 , but in Phase II member states allowed differing amounts of CDM/JI to be used for
compliance, and this allowance can be banked into the third phase (Germany allowed
12% of total allocation to be used). Post-2012 will allow using CDM credits amounting
up to 3% of a country's non-ETS emissions, and any unused "capacity" can be traded
between EU-ETS participants. In addition to this, the EU Commission will continue to
5 Even though there had been no cap on the use of CDM/JI credits in Phase I, the slow
registration of credits at the UNFCCC Executive Board and the lack of a common IT platform
integration hindered any significant amount of CDM credits to be surrendered under Phase I.
allow all CDM credits from projects in Least Developing Countries that were registered
between 2008 and 2012. Given protectionist tendencies and fears of carbon leakage
through non-additional projects in developing countries, the total amount of CDM credits
finally allowed during Phase III could even be below this number, greatly reducing the
demand in the global market.
Linking of Schemes and Arbitrage
One often discussed topic is the linking of different emissions trading markets, and the
obvious candidates for linking would be the EU-ETS and the Federal American carbon
trading scheme if it comes into being. Using the same "carbon currency" or accepting the
emissions allowances from other linked-up schemes can directly link different markets.
While it is very difficult to predict the exact form of the US scheme, given the myriad of
proposals currently being debated in the House of Representatives and the US Senate, it
is very possible that an American scheme will not be directly fungible with the EU-ETS,
although both schemes might accept the CDM. In such a case the CDM would flow to the
higher price scheme, leading towards a convergence of prices. A non-compliance buyer
could, for example, arbitrage the spread between the two schemes and "exchange" the
carbon credits using the CER as an intermediary currency in two steps:
1. An EU-ETS market participant sells an EUA and purchases a CER
2. The CER is bought by an American buyer who then sells the CER and
purchases an American emissions allowance
In this way, a European credit has been, in effect, sold to an American compliance buyer
and would be a way to arbitrage prices and to force at least partial convergence of prices.
In an efficient market with zero transaction costs and no cap on the amount of CER
credits allowed into the market, the two emissions trading regimes would thus be linked
and prices would be equal. Given that the market is likely to be shielded from both sides,
most notably through price floors and ceilings, the actual integration of the markets will
likely be limited.
Figure 7.7: Linking of Schemes via the CDM
Source: World map image taken from http://www.webresourcesdepot. com/wp-
content/uploads/image/free-vector-world-map. gif
7.2 Impact of Renewable Energy Policy on Carbon Abatement
In addition to CDM and JI, emissions trading is also affected by Renewable Energy
policy which, perhaps unexpectedly, can favor marginal investments in coal over gas.
The growth of Renewable energy has been stunning, aided by aggressive government
targets in many legislations as a means to diversify energy generation portfolios and
reduce overall carbon emissions. The European Union, home of some of the most
generous feed-in tariffs, has set itself ambitious goals, namely to derive 20% of the
energy mix from Renewable energy by 2020, compared to 8.5% today, with intermediate
targets being set in two year intervals to ensure that countries deliver their mandates.
These targets are specified on a member-state level, with all countries having to increase
the use of renewables by 5.5% with the remaining increases being mandated to the
strongest economies as measured by GDP. These targets are outlined in the figure below:
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Figure 7.8: Renewables portion of total energy in 2005 and 2020 Goal
Source: Euractiv, 2009
The large contribution of renewables to Germany's total energy has already been
discussed in Chapter 2. As of 2009, the government feed-in tariffs have been further
adapted to encourage the development of offshore wind and the repowering of existing
renewable energy assets. The German Federal Ministry of the Environment
(Bundesumweltministerium) estimates that in 2007 alone, Renewable Energies resulted
in 78.9 million tons of carbon abatement. However, the top-down estimates are based on
2000-2004 trends, so one can only count the marginal abatement since the trend years,
otherwise double counting the abatement from renewables that had already occurred by
the base year of the trend. Since the carbon abatement from renewables, such as hydro, is
relatively steady, the real impact on emissions is gained from the advances in wind and
solar. The data takes 2002 as the base year and hence finds marginal abatement from
renewables as 10.6, 13.1 and 22.6 million tons for 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively.
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Figure 7.9: Abatement Estimates and Reported renewables Abatement
Source: Authors' calculations and BMU 2008, 2007, 2006
The top-down estimate that is compared to this bottom-up data is based on the carbon
intensity trends using power sector data. The top-down and bottom-up data coincide
relatively well; this shows that marginal abatement from the renewables sector is most
likely the other source of carbon abatement, next to abatement from fuel switching that
was calculated in Chapter 2 using the E-simulate model.
The data shows that during times of high carbon prices, the marginal abatement from
carbon trading is comparable to the marginal abatement from wind and solar power, and
the data from 2008 onwards which showed relatively high carbon prices will show more
significant abatement.
Interaction of the Renewable Energy on the Merit Order
One of the key interactions of Renewable Energy is that it displaces high cost capacity
from the total power generation mix. Since Renewable Energy in Germany benefits from
very generous feed-in tariffs they are always effectively dispatched. Reinaud (2003)
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discusses how a higher use of renewable energy production results in lower thermal
production and hence leads to a reduction of total emissions.
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Figure 7.10: Renewable Energy mandates displacing fossil capacity
Source: Renaud 2003.
The impact this has on the relative use of gas and coal power assets depends on the level
of the carbon price and marginal fuel during the point of renewables dispatch. Thus
renewables will displace fossil fuel capacity and, depending on the merit order, this will
either be coal or gas, leading to a reduction in a capacity factor. In a low carbon price
scenario this would almost certainly displace gas capacity, as shown in a schematic
manner in the graph above. It will also definitely displace the low efficiency gas plants
that are among the last to be dispatched, unless carbon prices rise very high and thus
increase the number of hours in which coal is the marginal fuel. While the overall effect
is a reduction in carbon emissions, the overall long-term impact is to reduce the absolute
capacity of fossil fuel dispatch. From the sensitivity analysis shown in Chapter 5, a slight
reduction in the capacity factor for coal plants has a smaller impact on profitability than a
reduction of the capacity factor in gas plants. This in turn, reduces the long-term
profitability of gas investments and helps to explain, why marginal power investments in
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Germany have been mostly in Renewable Energy, such as wind and - in fossil power -
could be seen to favor coal over gas.
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8. Discussion and Conclusions: Assessing the
Outcomes
This chapter seeks to summarize the economic and environmental policy effects of
carbon trading; it also seeks to summarize the evidence presented in this thesis for the
preference of coal over gas investments in Germany.
8.1. Conclusions on Economic Implications of Carbon Trading
The persistence of coal in the German power sector comes down to the fact that coal has
been the more profitable fuel in Germany and continues to be so. Three different analysis
metrics and methods have been applied in this thesis: Return analysis, marginal fuel
analysis from the bottom-up model, and spread analysis from commodity prices. The
application of these methods has found a preference for coal; unless the fundamental
commodity prices or power generation technologies significantly reduce the costs of gas-
fired generation, the trend for coal investments in the fossil fuel space are unlikely to
change.
As shown in details in Chapter 5 of the thesis, the return on equity investments and net
present value of a gas plant investment is slightly higher than that of coal in the base case
scenario. Yet, after adjusting the base case to lower capacity factors closer to what has
been observed in the market, coal is more profitable. Both factors became evident in the
analysis of sensitivities assuming the base case of technologies available, fuel prices, and
carbon prices. The net present value assumes the allocation mechanisms as decided by
the European Parliament in December 2008. The net present value of the coal plant
investment is 141.8 mn Euros with an internal rate of return of the project cash flows of
13.6% while the gas plant dispatched as baseload has a mean NPV of 39.0 mn Euros and
an IRR of 15.8%; a peaking plant results in an NPV of 128.7 mn Euros and an IRR of
28.6%. These figures represent the mean of the investments, generated using 10,000
Monte-Carlo draws based on the price distributions of the relevant fuel and carbon price
distributions. Both investment options have a possibility of generating negative returns. It
is important to note that all the assumptions for the discounted cash flow model are very
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conservative, and sensitivity analysis shows that coal investments could be more
profitable when looking at the fuel spreads seen on the power markets over Phase I.
Power prices have increased significantly since the introduction of carbon trading to
reflect, among other things, the opportunity and real costs of carbon. Hence, the lower
part of the distributions represents power price levels that are unlikely to be seen in the
market unless fuel prices decrease significantly.
Profitability Comparison- Gas and Coal
Gas_Base: NPV= 39.0 Gas Peak: NPV= 128.7 Coal: NPV= 141.8
Gas Base: IRR= 15.8% GasPeak: IRR= 28.6% Coal: IRR= 13.6%
350 350 Gas- Base 0 Coal
E Gas- Peak E Mean Gas -Base
3 Mean-Coal * Mean-Gas- Peak
300
250
* 200
• 150
100-
50
-200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650
NPV
Figure 8.1: Net Present Value Distribution and Mean Returns
Source: Model calculations
8.1.2. Marginal Fuel analysis translates into low capacity factors for gas
Chapter 2 has discussed the use of the bottom-up power sector model, "E-simulate",
which was used to estimate carbon abatement from short-term fuel switching. This least
cost linear optimization model calculates optimal dispatch of the available generation
fleet in hourly intervals. One of the outputs that this model generates is the marginal fuel
of the power system every hour. When the ramping constraints associated with the
various generation technologies are applied and the daily carbon prices are accounted for,
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the model provides the marginal fuel, which makes evident how many hours of the year
coal or gas plants can be operated profitably. In reality, utility companies are unlikely to
change the dispatch of large amounts of capacity based on these movements, yet if one
assumes that the power plant investment meets only marginal demand, one can use the
marginal fuel as an indicator for the likely capacity factor to be expected for gas. In both
power investment models, the capacity factor is the second most sensitive input variable
after the full load efficiency that is determined chiefly by the technical attributes of the
power plants. What becomes apparent from this type of analysis is that capacity factors
for gas plants could potentially be much lower than the 80-85% assumed in the
investment model, as gas plants are only running at peak times. This deteriorates the
economics of gas plants and increases the relative attractiveness of coal investments.
Sensitivity of Key Variables expressed h terms of NPV of Gas Plant
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Figure 8.2: Sensitivity of Key Variables of a Gas Investment
Source: Model calculations
A more in-depth model would add the marginal investment plant to the bottom-up model
and iteratively run the bottom-up model year by year. This would require significant
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assumptions on forward-looking hourly power demand, the annual changes in all
segments of the power generation portfolio, as well as price forecasts over the entire plant
life. Long term, large-scale analysis methods become sensitive to the economic feedback
effects, which would require different types of models. MARKAL models, for example,
iteratively solve engineering cost models that are linked with a partial or general
equilibrium models to simulate economic feedbacks. This type of analysis, however, is
beyond the scope of this thesis, but would be an obvious choice for extending this
research.
Larger spreads strengthen coal and fuel prices dominate carbon effects
One of the key analysis metrics used in the power industry are the spreads that a company
is earning for generating power. These spreads make several simplifying assumptions on
the production efficiencies of the power producing assets and take the heat rates of the
respective fuels into consideration. The simple spreads only account for marginal costs
and do not include the need to recoup capital costs for the investments. Positive spreads
indicate that it is more profitable to generate power than to purchase the electricity from
the market. These spreads are quoted on Bloomberg; there is, however, only very limited
historic data available for these spreads. Hence, the spreads were recreated from first
principles using long-dated price series. While the absolute value of the spreads is
interesting, the real question for making a relative investment decision between coal and
gas is the movement of the difference of the dark and spark spreads.
The figure below gives a long-time series of these spreads from the end of 2000 until
February 2009. The figure shows the difference of the clean spreads, i.e. those spreads
that already account for the carbon price.
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Figure 8.3: Clean Spreads for Coal and Gas from 2000-2009
Source: Bloomberg, ECX, model calculations
The outcome is striking. The large majority of days show a higher profitability of coal
plants versus gas plants. There are clearly seasonal effects of commodity prices that can
be seen in the data; over the summer month, when gas prices tend to be lower than in the
winter months, the dark-spark spread briefly turns negative, indicating that it is more
profitable to operate a gas plant. Moreover, the absolute value of the spread difference
indicates that coal plant investments have actually become more profitable versus gas
since the introduction of carbon emissions trading. This is a slightly counter-intuitive
result, but with great explanatory power for the recent announcements of new coal builds
as outlined in Chapters 3 of the thesis. While in the time before carbon emissions trading,
it was more profitable on 65.7% of trading days to operate coal power plants versus gas
plants. During the emissions trading scheme this increased to 81.5% of trading days,
showing a clear preference for coal over gas. Even if one uses Phase II carbon prices,
coal still prevails in 73% of the days.
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Table 8.1: Clean Spreads using spot prices for carbon
Clean Spreads
using Phase II 2000-2004 with Hypothetical
Carbon Clean Spreads and Spot Carbon Carbon Prices
2005-2008 2005-2008 2000-2004 8 EUR 15 EUR
Days with Positive Spread 707 745 617 406 260
Total Days with Data 969 914 939 939 939
Fraction Coal Dominance 72.96% 81.51% 65.71% 43.24% 27.69%
Fraction Coal Dominance-
Capital Cost Adjusted 69.45% 78.34% 58.25% 36.53% 24.07%
Source: Bloomberg, model calculations
8.2. Environmental Goals and Environmental Policy Issues
Having ascertained the clear economic argument for why coal is preferable in comparison
with gas in Germany, there are the remaining issues of the environmental goals and the
interactions of carbon trading policy with other environmental policies, as already
discussed in Chapter 6.
SE-simulate Bottom Up Marginal Renewables Abatement Top Down Estimate
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Figure 8.4: Top down and bottom up estimates of abatement in the power sector
Source: BMU and model calculations
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Carbon emissions trading is only one mechanism to reduce the carbon intensity of the
economy and the power sector more specifically. Chapter 2 discusses the mechanisms of
fuel switching and calculates bottom-up values of the carbon abatement due to utilities
dispatching gas rather than coal. Top-down approaches look at the carbon intensity of the
economy or parts of the economy and use these trends to establish an emissions
counterfactual against which abatement can be measured. Chapter 7 discusses the
mechanism of how marginal abatement from renewables and fuel switching correlate
closely with the top down abatement estimate of the power sector.
Outlook to Future Work
The work applies several top-down and bottom-up modeling techniques for assessing the
impact of a carbon price on the power sector. The thesis has quantified the short-term
carbon abatement potential from fuel switching as well as presented long-term effects of
the carbon price on investment behavior. The various model outcomes are compared and
reconciled with first empirical data that has become available since the inception of the
European emissions trading scheme in 2005. While the discussion of the results has
focused on the key assumptions and outcomes, the results presented in this thesis could
be used as a foundation for future research. For example, the wider implications of a
carbon price on investment effects could be modeled such as more granular technology
options in coal and gas plants, or utility-scale Renewable energy options such as a wind
or technologies such as CCS to continue the work of this thesis in understanding the in-
depth effects of the carbon price.
109
References
Ahman, M. et al., 2007. A Ten-Year Rule to guide the allocation of EU emission
allowances. Energy Policy, 35(3), 1718-1730.
Ahman, M., Holmgren, K., 2006. Harmonising New Entrant Allocation in the Nordic
Energy Sectors: Current Principles and Options for EU ETS Phase II. IVL
Swedish Environmental Research Institute, Stockholm, Sweden.
Ashford, N. (2002): Technology focused regulatory approaches. Paper presented at the
3rd Blueprint workshop on ,,Instruments for Integrating Environmental and
Innovation Policy", 26/27 September 2002, Brussels.
Atkinson, S.E. & Tietenberg, T.H., 1987. Economic Implications of Emissions Trading
Rules for Local and Regional Pollutants. Canadian Journal ofEconomics, 20(2),
370-86.
Bader, P. 2000: Europiische Treibhauspolitik mit handelbaren Emissionsrechten
Empfehlungen fi~r die Umsetzung der Kyoto-Verpflichtung vor dem Hintergrund
US -amerikanischer Lizenzierungserfahrungen. Berlin
Betz, R., 2006. EU emissions trading: an early analysis of national allocation plans for
2008-2012. Climate Policy, 6, 361-394.
BDEW (Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft) (ed.) 2009: Im Bau oder in
Planung befindliche Kraftwerke - differenziert nach Jahr der voraussichtlichen
Inbetriebnahme (Stand: Januar 2009). Berlin
Blyth, W.; Yang, M. 2006: Impact of Climate Change Policy Uncertainty in Power
Investment. IEA (International Energy Agency), IEA Working Papers
LTO/2006/02. Paris
Bihringer, C.; Hoffmann, T.; Lange, A.; Lschel, A.; Moslener, U. 2004: Assessing
Emission Allocation in Europe. An Interactive Simulation Approach. ZEW
(Zentrum flir Europ5iische Wirtschaftsforschung), Discussion Paper 04-40.
Mannheim.
Botterud, A.; Korpats, M. 2004: Modelling of power generation investment incentives
under uncertainty in liberalised electricity markets. Dept.of Electrical Power
Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim.
Brewer, T.L., 2005. Business perspectives on the EU emissions trading scheme. Available
110
at:http ://md 1 .csa.com/partners/viewrecord.php?requester=gs&collection=ENV&r e
cid=7276592&q=Brewer+Business+perspectives+on+the+EU+emissions+trading
+scheme&uid=&setcookie=yes, accessed January 28, 2009.
Buchner, B. 2007: Policy Uncertainty, Investment and Commitment Periods. IEA
(International Energy Agency) COM/ENV/EPOC/IEA/SLT(2007)8. Paris.
http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2007/Uncertainty_Investment&Commitment.
pdf, accessed January 15, 2009.
Buchner, B.; Bosetti, V.; Carraro, C. 2004: Climate Policy and the Kyoto Protocol -
Banking Provision. Does it Really Matter? FEEM (Fondazione ENI Enrico
Mattei) Milan. http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/prj-2004_2005/kankyou/kankyoul 6/03-
1-R.pdf, accessed March 10, 2009.
Bundesumweltministerium der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BMU, 2008):
http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/inhalt/41019/ accessed May 31, 2008
Bundeswirtschaftsministerium der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BMWi, 2008):
Energiedatensammlung vom 2.1.2008.
http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/Binaer/energie-daten-
gesamt,property=blob,bereich=bmwi,sprache=de,rwb=true.xls accessed April 20,
2009.
Bundesumweltministerium der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BMU, 2007):
Hintergrundpapier - Emissionshandel in der zweiten Handelsperiode 2008 - 2012 -
Einfacher - wirksamer - effizienter. Berlin.
http://www.bmu.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/hg_emissionshandel2008
_2012.pdf accessed March 3, 2009.
Burtraw, D.; Palmer, K.; Bharvirkar, R.; Paul, A. 2002: The Effect on Asset Values of the
Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances. RFF (Resources for the
Future), Discussion Paper 02-15. Washington, D.C.
Busch T, Weinhofer G, Hoffmann VH: "Whither carbonomics? The carbon performance
of the 100 largest US electricity producers", submitted to Journal of Industrial
Ecology.
Coase, R.H. 1960: The Problem of Social Cost. In: Journal of Law and Economics. Vol.
3 (October). pp 1-44
Convery, F.; Ellerman, D.; de Perthuis, C. "The European carbon market in action:
Lessons from the first trading period - Interim Report"
http://www.aprec.net/documents/08-03-25 interim report en.pdfaccessed May
20, 2008
Cramton, P.; Kerr, S. 2002: Tradeable Carbon Permit Auctions - How and why to auction
111
not grandfather. In: Energy Policy. Vol. 30. pp 333-345.
http://www.cramton.umd.edu/papers2000-2004/02ep-tradeable-carbon-permit-
auctions.pdf, accessed February 25, 2009.
Dales, J.H. 1968: Land, Water, and Ownership. In: The Canadian Journal of Economics.
Vol. 1 (4). pp 791-804.
De Neufville, Richard 2003: Real Options: Dealine with uncertainty in systems planning
and design. In: Integrated Assessment. Vol. 4 (1). Pp. 26-34.
DEHSt (Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle) (ed.) 2004: Emissionsfaktoren und
Kohlenstoffgehalte. Berlin.
http://www.dehst.de/cln 006/nn 476194/SharedDocs/Downloads/ Archiv/Antra
astellung_ dl/Emissionsfaktoren und C-
Gehalte,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Emissionsfaktoren und C-
Gehalte.pdf, accessed February 25, 2009.
DEHSt (Deutsche Emissionshandelsstelle im Umweltbundesamt) 2005: Implementation
of emissions trading in the EU - national allocation plans of all EU States - Brief
fact sheets of EU member state allocation plans. Berlin.
http://www.dehst.de/cln 007/nn 593634/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/ETS/EU
NAP Vergleich,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/EU NAP Verglei
ch, accessed February 25, 2009.
Delarue, Erik D; Ellerman, Denny A.; Ellerman and D'haeseleer, William D. "Short-term
C02 abatement in the Power Sector", forthcoming publication.
Delarue, E., K. Voorspools and W. D'haeseleer, "Fuel switching in the electricity sector
under the EU ETS", Journal of Energy Engineering, forthcoming.
Ecofys, 2004. Analysis of the National Allocation Plans for the EU Emissions Trading
System. Report to UK Department of Trade and Industry and Department for
environment, Food and Rural Affairs, London.
ECX (European Climate Exchange) 2008: Historical data - ECX CFI Futures Contract.
http://www.europeanclimateexchange.com/content.asp, accessed April 15, 2009.
EIA: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/tablees1b.html accessed May 31,
2008
Ellerman AD, Buchner B. 2006. Over-Allocation or Abatement? A Preliminary Analysis
of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Based on the 2006 Emissions Data. MIT
Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 141.
Ellerman, A.D. 2006: New Entrant and Closure Provisions: How do they distort? MIT
CEEPR, Working Papers WP-2006-013. Cambridge/MA.
112
Ellerman, A. Denny, Barbara K. Buchner, and Carlo Carraro (eds.) (2007), "Allocation in
the European Emissions Trading Scheme: Rights, Rents and Fairness", Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Ellerman, A. D., Joskow, P. L., and Harrison, D. (2003). Emissions trading in the US:
Experience, lessons and considerations for greenhouse gases. Prepared for the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change.
Ellerman, A.D.; Joskow, P.L.; Schmalensee, R.; Montero, J.-P.; Bailey, E.M. 2000:
Markets for Clean Air. The U.S. Acid Rain Program. Cambridge
Ellerman, A. D. and Parsons, J. E. (2006). Shortage, inter-period pricing and banking.
Tendances Carbone, 5.
EnergieStG - . Available at: http://bundesrecht.iuris.de/energiestg/ 2.html#, accessed
March 17, 2009.
Ernst & Young, 2007. International Comparison of Depreciation Rules and Tax Rates for
Selected Energy Investments. Ernst & Young Quantitative Economics and
Statistics Group, May 2, 2007.
European Comission, 2003. 2003/87/EC (European Parliament and Council of the
European Union): Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission
allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive
96/61/EC. In: Official Journal of the European Union. L 275. pp 32-46.
Strasbourg, Brussels. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/1 275/1 27520031025en00320046.pdf
European Commissions, 2005. COM(2005) 703 (Commission of the European
Communities): Communication from the Commission "Further guidance on
allocation plans for the 2008 to 2012 trading period of the EU Emission Trading
Scheme". Brusseld. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0703enO 1.pdf, accessed,
November 20, 2008.
European Comission, 2008. 2008/0013 (European Parliament and Council of the
European Union): Proposal to amend Directive 2003/87/EC as to improve and
extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community
European Parliament, 2008. Legislative resolution of 17 December 2008 on the proposal
for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance
trading system of the Community (P6_TA-PROV(2008)0610).
113
EWI; Prognos (Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitit zu K61n, Prognos AG)
2007: Energieszenarien fir den Energiegipfel 2007. Basel, K61n.
http ://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2007/07/Anlage/2007-07-03-
energieszenarien, property =publicationFile.pdf
Fischer, C. 2005: Technical innovation and design choices for emissions trading and other
climate policies. In: Hansjiirgens, B. (ed.), Emissions Trading for Climate Policy -
US and European Perspectives. Cambridge. pp 37-52
Gagelmann, M.F., 2006. The impact of emission trading on innovation - science fiction or
reality, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/l0.1002/eet.38.
Grubb, M.; Koehler, J. 2000: Induced technical change: Evidence and implications for
energy-environmental modelling and policy. Cambridge University, Department of
Applied Economics, Working Paper Cambridge.
Grubb, M.; Neuhoff, K. 2006: Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions
trading scheme: policy overview. In: Climate Policy. Vol. 6. pp 7-30.
Harrison, D. & Radov, D., 2002. Evaluation of Alternative Initial Allocation Mechanisms
in a European Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading Scheme.
Hoffmann VH, 2007. "EU Emission Trading Scheme and technology investment decisions
- the case of the German electricity industry", European Management Journal
25(6): 464-474
IEA: CITL Viewer the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in numbers
http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/atlas/viewdata/viewpub.asp?id=3 529 accessed
April 20, 2008.
IEA (International Energy Agency) 2007: Tackling Investment Challenges in Power
Generation in IEA Countries. Paris
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) 2007c: Fourth Assessment Report -
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Geneva.
Jansen M. (ed.) 2004: Auctioning public assets: Analysis and Alternatives, Cambridge
University Press.
Kapoor, C. & Ambrosi, P. State and Trends of the Carbon Market, 2007. World Bank
Publications, Washington DC, 2007.
Klemperer P. 2002: What really matters in auction design, The Journal of Economic
Perspective, 16, pp. 169-189.
114
Lambie, N.R. 2002. Analyzing the effect of a distribution of carbon permits from a firm
investment. Paper presented at 46t Annual Conference of the Agricultural and
Resource Economics Society, Canberra, Australia.
Laurikka, H. & Koljonen, T., 2006. Emissions trading and investment decisions in the
power sector-a case study in Finland. Energy Policy, 34(9), 1063-1074.
L6schel, A. 2001: Technological Change in Economic Models of Environmental Policy: A
Survey. ZEW (Zentrum flir Europiische Wirtschaftsforschung), Discussion Paper
01-62. Mannheim.
Matthes, F.C. et al: The Environmental Effectiveness and economic efficiency of the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Oko-Institut, Berlin.
http://assets.wwf.es/downloads/ets estructura oeko completo.pdfaccessed April
10, 2009.
Matthes, F.C.; Neuhoff, K. 2007: Auctioning in the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme. (Oko-Institut, University of Cambridge).
http://climatestrategies.org/uploads/Auctioning_inthe_EU_ETS_-
_Report. pdf?PHPSESSID=a5a93e99ba2c9f8b856bbd8ff47234ea accessed
Feburary 8, 2009.
Neuhoff, K., Martinez, K.K. & Sato, M., 2006. Allocations, incentives and distortions:
The impact of EU ETS emissions allowance allocations to the electicity sector.
Climate Policy, 6(1), 73-91.
Nordhaus, W.D. 2002: Modeling Induced Innovation in Climate-Change Policy. In:
Gribler, A.; Nakicenovic, N.; Nordhaus, W.D. (ed.), Technological Change and the
Environment. Washington DC. pp 182-209.
Paulsson, F.V.M., 200. Carbon dioxide emission trading, or not? An institutional analysis
of company behaviour in Sweden, http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/csr.6 accessed
February 25, 2009.
Philibert, C.; Reinaud, J. 2004: Emissions Trading: Taking Stock and Looking Forward.
IEA (International Energy Agency) Paris.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/59/32140134.pdf
Pigou, A.C. 1932: The Economics of Welfare. London, 4. ed.
http://oll.libertyfund.org/EBooks/Pigou_0316.pdf
Pinkse, J., 2007. Corporate intentions to participate in emission tradin, Available at:
115
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bse.46.
Point Carbon 2008. "Carbon 2008, Post-2012 is now", figure 3.1, page 23, 11 March
2008; Point Carbon Publications, Oslo.
Reilly, J.M.; Paltsev, S. 2005: An Analysis of the European Emission Trading Scheme.
MIT Joint Program (Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Joint Program on
the Science and Policy of Global Change), Report No. 127. Cambridge/MA, USA.
http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC Rptl27.pdf accessed
February 25, 2009.
Reinaud, J., 2003. Emissions trading and its possible impacts on investment decisions.
Available at:
http ://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=Reinaud+Emissions+trading+and
+its+po ssible+impacts+on+investment+decisions&btnG=Search, accessed
January 28, 2009.
Reinaud, J., 2004. Industrial Competitiveness under the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme. IEA Information Paper.
http://194.245.121.74/fileadmin/gruppen/bdz/Themen/Umwelt/IEA-Studie 11-
2004.pdf accessed April 20, 2009.
Schleich, J.; Cremer, C. 2007: Using benchmarking for the primary allocation of EU
allowances - An application to the German power sector. ISI (Fraunhofer Institute
Systems and Innovation Research), Working Paper Sustainability and Innovation
S 6/2007. Karlsruhe.
http://www.isi.fhg.de/e/working%20papers/WP Benchmarking.pdf, accessed
February 25, 2009.
Schleich, J.; Ehrhart, K.-M.; Hoppe, C.; Seifert, S. 2006: Banning banking in EU
emissions trading? In: Energy Policy. Vol. 34. pp 112-120, accessed February 25,
2009.
Schleich, J., Rogge, K. & Betz, R., 2009. Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme. Energy Efficiency, 2(1), 37-67.
Sekar, R.C. et al., 2007. Future carbon regulations and current investments in alternative
coal-fired power plant technologies. Energy Policy, 35(2), 1064-1074.
Sijm, J; Neuhoff, K., Chen, Yihsu, 2006. C02 cost pass-through and windfall profits in
the power sector. Climate Policy 6, 49-72.
Stavins, R. N. 1996. Correlated Uncertainty and Policy Instrument Choice. In: Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management. Vol. 30. pp 218-232.
116
http://enviro.colorado.edu/class/8535/CorrUncertainty. pdf
Stem, N. (ed.) 2006: Stem Review: The Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge.
http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent reviews/stern review economics climate change/ste
rn review report.cfm, accessed February 26, 2009.
Sterner, T.; Hammar, H. 2005: Designing instruments for climate policy. In: Hansjtirgens,
B. (ed.), Emissions Trading for Climate Policy - US and European Perspectives.
Cambridge. pp 17-36
Tietenberg, T.H. 1985: Emissions Trading. An exercise in reforming pollution policy.
Washington, DC
Trigeorgis, L. 1995: Real options: an overview. In: Trigeorgis, L. (ed.), Real Options in
CapitalInvestment: Models, Strategies, and Applications. Westport, CT. pp 1-30
Tseng, C. & Barz, G., 2002. Short-Term Generation Asset Valuation: A Real Options
Approach. OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 50(2), 297-310.
Ulrich Obemdorfer, K.R., 200. Costs and competitiveness effects of the European Union
emissions trading scheme, Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/eet.43.
VIK (Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft) 2005: VIK-Berechnungen
zu den Windfall Profits der Strombranche durch den CO2-Emissionshandel. Essen.
http://www.vik.de/fileadmin/vik/Pressemitteilungen/JPK2005/VIK Berechnungen
Windfall Profits.pdf, accessed February 26, 2009.
Voorspools, K. (2004). The modeling of the power generation of large interconnected
power systems in the framework of emission reduction strategies and the
liberalization of the market, doctoral thesis, K.U.Leuven, Applied Mechanics and
Energy Conversion, Leuven
http://www.mech.kuleuven.be/tme/resources/docs/doct/voorspools.pdf accessed
April 30, 2008.
Weishaar, S. 2008: The ECJ on ex post adjustments under the EU ETS. In: Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law. Vol. 17 (1).
Weitzman, M.L. 1974: Prices vs. Quantities. In: Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 41 (4).
pp 477-491.
Yang, M., 2007. Climate Policy Uncertainty and Investment Risk, IEA. Available at:
http://www.iea.org/Textbase/publications/free new Desc.asp?PUBS ID=1897,
accessed January 29, 2009.
117
Zapfel, P.; Vainio, M. 2002: Pathways to European Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading
History and Misconceptions. FEEM (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei), Nota Di
Lavoro 85, 2002.
Zhao, J., 2003. Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable
emission permits and emissions charges. Journal ofPublic Economics, 87(12),
2765-2789.
118
Annex I:
Mean Values and Distribution Types of All Data Series used:
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Data Series: Units Mean Distribution Type
Gas-2000-2008 EUR/TJ 4244.59 Log-normal
Gas-2005-2008 EUR/TJ 5860.60 Normal
Coal-2000-2008 EUR/t 57.56 Log-normal
Coal-2005-2008 EUR/t 74.38 Log-normal
Carbon: 2005-2008- Dec 09 contract EUR/t 20.40 Normal
Power-Base: 2000-2008 EUR/MWh 36.64 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008 EUR/MWh 51.51 Log-normal
Power-Peak: 2000-2008 EUR/MWh 70.97 Log-normal
Power-Peak: 2005-2008 EUR/MWh 71.76 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- Zero Pass EUR/MWh 32.09 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- 0.25 Pass EUR/MWh 37.05 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- 0.5 Pass EUR/MWh 42.01 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- 0.75 Pass EUR/MWh 46.96 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- Full Pass EUR/MWh 51.92 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- 1.25 Pass EUR/MWh 56.88 Beta
Power-Peak: 2005-2008- Zero Pass EUR/MWh 64.15 Beta
Power-Peak: 2005-2008- 0.25 Pass EUR/MWh 66.04 Beta
Power-Peak: 2005-2008- 0.5 Pass EUR/MWh 67.93 Beta
Power-Peak: 2005-2008- 0.75 Pass EUR/MWh 69.82 Beta
Power-Peak: 2005-2008- Full Pass EUR/MWh 71.72 Beta
Power-Base: 2005-2008- 1.25 Pass EUR/MWh 73.61 Beta
Annex II:
The investment model is difficult to represent in paper form and screen shots did not print
in a sufficiently legible quality.
For a copy of the excel and MATLAB files please email the author at
stephan marvin@yahoo.com
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